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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This study is a contribution to the ongoing debate concerning the future of 
South Africa’s  macro-economic policy known as the Growth, Employment 
and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy. The study attempts to draw parallels 
between the GEAR macro-economic policy framework and structural 
adjustment programmes in the South.  By making use of this comparison, the 
study argues that the outcome of the GEAR will be no different from structural 
adjustment programmes in that it will fail to reduce poverty and cause 
government to meet the basic needs of the people. These conclusions are 
drawn from the fact that the GEAR policy is premised on the faith that the 
market is capable of redistributing income and wealth, and providing people 
with their basic needs.         
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    INTRODUCTION 
                                  __________________________ 
 
Throughout the highly illustrious history of the African National Congress (ANC), 
debates about the vision of a post-apartheid economy policy have always 
assumed a serious character. The first step towards the formulation of this new 
vision was taken by the ANC in 1955 when the Freedom Charter (hereafter the 
Charter) was produced. In its comprehensiveness, the Charter expressed the 
desire of the liberation movement to construct a new society based on alternative 
sets of policies and a different constitutionalism. Thus, throughout the liberation 
struggle, and in the 1980s especially, the ANC continued to mobilise its 
supporters behind the aims of the Charter. 
 
Essentially, the objectives of the Charter entailed the transformation of the entire 
social, political and economic order within South Africa. Its preamble declared a 
common citizenship between blacks and whites and also that governance had to 
be based on the ‘will of the people’ (ANC, 1985: 1). The Charter also enunciated 
equal rights, the protection of human rights, equality before the law and peace. 
On socio-economic transformation, the Charter proposed a ‘minimum wage’ for 
workers, land redistribution, access for all to education and health, including the 
provision of houses. The main economic demand was for the redistribution of 
wealth from monopolies to the people. Thus, it was proposed that the banks, 
mines and the wines industry were to be nationalised and trade controlled by the 
government to ‘assist the well-being of the people’ (ANC, 1985: 2). Finally, the 
Charter argued that these steps were necessitated by the fact that the structure 
of the South African apartheid economy had negatively affected the living 
standards of other races and blacks in particular. 
 
The ANC’s Freedom Charter received support from other anti-apartheid 
movements such as the South African Communist Party (SACP), the South 
African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU), the Coloured People’s Congress, 
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Congress of Democrats (COD) and the South African Indian Congress (SAIC). 
As allies of the ANC, these organisations had also collaborated in formulating the 
Charter. The Charter was also warmly received by Nelson Mandela (1956), who 
praised it as a ‘revolutionary document’ which served as a ‘beacon to the 
Congress Movement and an inspiration to the people of South Africa’. SACTU’s 
Billy Nair also argued that the Charter accommodated the interests of workers, 
even though it accommodated equally the demands of other classes and was not 
a blueprint for socialism (Suttner and Cronin: 1986). In 1986, the Charter was 
endorsed even by the United Democratic Front (UDF) – a broad alliance of anti-
apartheid formations which spearheaded defiance and mass protests in the 
1980s -  and by the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU).   
 
Thus, more than thirty years later, leaders of the ANC continued to espouse 
redistribution and shaped popular struggles towards that goal. At the height of 
the resistance in the 1980s, Joe Slovo (1986: 21), maintained that the main 
grievances behind the liberation struggle concerned the redistribution of wealth. 
Hence, he argued that: 
 
 “ The main thrust and content of the immediate struggle continues to 
revolve around the Freedom Charter which provides for a minimum 
  platform of a non-racial, united democratic South Africa based on the 
           rule of the majority ”. 
 
At the start of the ANC’s negotiations with the National Party (NP) government in 
1990, Thabo Mbeki, now President of the Republic of South Africa and the 
liberation movement – the ANC - reiterated these demands by arguing that: 
 
“ The new government would have to have sufficient economic 
strength to address the question of the quality of life, and some- 
 thing has to be done about the control and distribution of wealth. 
              Nationalisation is an important element in this ”.  
   (Van Niekerk, 1990) 
  
Furthermore, the labour movement has assisted the ANC since the 1980s in 
detailing its economic policies along clearly defined ideological lines. This was 
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accomplished through the establishment of research units which looked into 
various aspects of the South African economy such as the recession of the 
1980s, industrial policy, the impact of sanctions and service delivery 
(Padayachee, 1998). COSATU also organised a conference in 1991 which 
adopted a Workers’ Charter which listed the basic socio-economic demands of 
workers such as a living wage, the right to social services and job security (Pillay, 
1991). An alliance forum was then formed to ensure that the demands that were 
listed informed the development of ANC economic policy. Finally, the labour 
movement used its power in the 1990s to have its role institutionalised (Baskin, 
1996) in order to help maintain the balance of forces in favour of the ANC’s 
developmentalist vision.  
 
ANC economic policies also provoked controversies. Between 1985 and 1994, 
ANC economic policies attracted an unprecedented level of interest from South 
African academics (Fine, 1994). There were, on the one hand, the progressive 
academic economists who through their association with the labour movement, in 
particular, supported the alternative developmentalist vision of the ANC 
(Padayachee, 1998). On the other hand, a different category of academics, the 
prophets of neo-liberalism, opposed the Charter by advocating a ‘business 
friendly’ economic policy. 
 
Nattrass (1994) criticised ANC economic policy for being vague and insufficient 
in details. She further contended that a major crisis which had afflicted the South 
African economy since 1989 was the drying up of private investment (Nattrass, 
1992: 1995). What the government needed to do, she argued, was to stipulate 
predictable policies which would stabilise the macro-economic environment and 
thereby encourage investor confidence. In effect, Nattrass advocated the well 
known structural adjustment policies of the international financial institutions 
(IFIs). The alternative view, on the other hand, argued that the crisis had its 
origins in the internal circumstances of the country; that is, the forty year long 
exclusion of blacks from the economy (Saul and Gelb, 1981). This view held that 
 4
only the state could be entrusted with the responsibility of redistribution and 
development.  
 
HOW A DEVELOPMENTALIST VISION WAS LOST. 
 
It was in the context of these debates in the run-up to the 1994 elections that the 
ANC formulated the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). Like 
the Charter, the RDP was a product of consultation between the ANC and its 
alliance partners, the SACP and COSATU, including the South African National 
Civic Organisations (SANCO). Moreover, the basic character of the consultation 
was that it was broadly a bottom-up popular approach which received 
endorsements in People’s Forums which the ANC convened throughout the 
country during its 1994 election campaign.  
 
Apart from stating its objectives such as meeting basic needs, democratisation, 
the development of South Africa’s human resources, and the monitoring of 
reconstruction and development (Heymans, 1995), the RDP linked growth with 
reconstruction and development (ANC, 1994: 6). Such a link was based on the 
premise that the state would invest in the building of infrastructure and provide 
access to services such as health, water, education, transport and electricity. 
Thus, for purposes of reconstruction and development, the state was accorded a 
leading role (Wolpe: 1995) whilst growth induced by markets was to take place 
through encouraging exports mainly. 
 
To fulfil the expectations about delivery, the ANC introduced steps for 
implementing the RDP after its overwhelming victory in the 1994 elections. 
Specific programmes such as the Presidential Lead Projects were announced 
and a special fund to finance the RDP was introduced. Since 1994, the measures 
taken by the ANC have culminated in a vast improvement in the living conditions 
of the poor.  
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The ANC government expanded service delivery by supplying clean water to 1.3 
million people; in terms of health, apart from the upgrading of over 500 clinics 
since 1994 (South Africa. Government’s Report to the Nation, 1998), the 
government provided pregnant women and children with free medical care. This 
was consistent with the demands of the Charter which proposed, inter alia, a 
‘preventive health scheme’ that was run by the state. The government also put 
into effect the idea of free and compulsory schooling by initiating a primary 
feeding scheme which reached 4.9 million children; the attempt to ‘eliminate 
slums’ saw 1.2 million houses being built;  and for the purposes of bringing 
‘security and comfort’ in rural areas mainly, over 400 000 households were 
electrified. In addition, the National Public Works Programme which involved 1 
000 projects also created approximately 42 000 jobs per annum (Goldin and 
Heymans, 1999). Thus, through the implementation of the RDP and in 
accordance with the terms of the Charter, the ANC secured the intervention of 
the state to bring about reconstruction and development. 
 
Two years after 1994, however, the government unveiled the macro-economic 
policy known as Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR). The objectives 
of GEAR differed fundamentally from those of the RDP. GEAR aimed at creating 
a ‘competitive fast-growing economy’ (South Africa. Department of Finance, 
1996). It argued that the South African economy was growing at an 
unsustainable rate of 3 percent per annum and that this therefore doomed hopes 
for job creation. As an alternative, GEAR proposed a growth rate of 6 percent 
which it projected would create 400 000 new jobs per annum. It was then 
proposed that these objectives would be achieved through the promotion of non-
gold exports, the expansion of private investment, liberalisation and the 
introduction of a flexible labour market. In short, GEAR advocated a market-
oriented economy in contrast to both the Freedom Charter and the RDP. 
Moreover, the strategy limited the role of the state to the creation of a ‘stable 
environment’ for the market only. Thus, Edward Osborne (1997), argued that the 
hallmarks of GEAR are tight monetary and fiscal policies, the liberalisation of the 
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economy and privatisation. Asghar Adelzadeh (1996) characterised GEAR as an 
adoption of neo-liberalism by the ANC government. 
  
The adoption of the GEAR policy thus provoked a heated debate within the 
tripartite alliance which has continued unabated over the past three years. 
COSATU and the SACP argued that as a homegrown version of the infamous 
IFIs structural adjustment programmes, GEAR was bound to circumscribe the 
role of the state in the economy and therefore, render it irrelevant in addressing 
the issues of skewed income distribution and a better life for the majority of South 
Africans (The Shopsteward, 1997: 6.4). Another concern was the fact that unlike 
the RDP, GEAR was a product which was co-designed by international financial 
institutions. Thus, an important element was neglected by its architects – the 
objective of restructuring the economy. Furthermore, it was argued that since 
GEAR was a product aimed at macro-economic restructuring, the cause of 
delivery was subsequently abandoned. In the final analysis, GEAR was 
perceived by both COSATU and the SACP to differ from the RDP not only in 
terms of goals, but most obviously in policy outcomes. COSATU and the SACP 
criticised GEAR for its parochial focus on growth without development. They 
pointed out that GEAR failed to protect existing jobs and create new ones and 
therefore concluded that the policy would be unable to address the problem of 
increasing poverty (SANGOCO, 1998).     
 
The prediction that GEAR would lead to unemployment is probably best 
demonstrated in figures of the South African Reserve Bank (SARB, 1998: June, 
No.208) and the Central Statistical Services (CSS, 1998: December). In the 
formal non-agricultural sector, for example, 130 00 workers lost their jobs at the 
end of 1997 and the public sector retrenched 30 000 workers. Throughout 1997, 
in addition, there were quarterly declines in employment in all sectors of the 
South African economy. Moreover, according  to the Human Sciences Research 
Council (1999) the situation is not likely to improve since employment 
opportunities are growing in the professional and managerial sectors only. The 
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plight of the unemployed was meanwhile highlighted in October 1998 when the 
government urgently convened the Job Summit (Horton, Tregenna and 
Ngqungwana, 1998). 
 
In spite of these developments and the criticism against GEAR, the Finance 
Director–General, Maria Ramos, continued to defend the government’s 
conservative macro-economic policy. She argued that GEAR was aimed at 
implementing the RDP (Ramos, 1997). This defence did not sit well with the 
broad ANC constituency.  Alec Erwin (1998) and Andrew Feinstein (1996) have 
also defended GEAR by arguing that it was necessitated by economic changes 
internationally. The fact of globalisation, in particular, meaning the integration of 
national economies into a single global economy, was seen to have pre-empted 
an alternative macro-economic policy. 
 
OBJECT OF THE THESIS. 
 
The objectives of this thesis are fairly limited. It merely seeks to make a 
contribution to the ongoing debate on the fecundity of South Africa’s Growth, 
Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) policy framework. In doing this, the 
thesis will not introduce any new material, but will seek a rigorous re-
interpretation of the existing literature. To this extent therefore, this study will be 
largely based on secondary material. 
 
The argument of the thesis is that since GEAR is essentially a structural 
adjustment programme, albeit one that is home-grown, it will increasingly fail to 
reduce poverty and will also constrain the delivery of basic needs by the 
government.   
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STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS. 
 
This thesis is divided into five chapters. 
 
Chapter one: This chapter is essentially a theoretical overview of the debates on 
the state and markets. It attempts to confront the main arguments of market 
fundamentalism. The chapter argues that the idea of a minimalist state has been 
discredited by the developments of the past two years. Hence it makes a case for 
development to be led by the state.  
 
Chapter two: This chapter traces the evolution of a developmental vision in the 
ANC from the Freedom Charter in 1955 to the Reconstruction and Development 
Programme (RDP) in 1994. It attempts to demonstrate the consistency in ANC 
economic policy from 1955 to 1994.  
 
Chapter three: This chapter focuses on the shift from the RDP to GEAR. It 
argues that, since 1994, there have been changes in the balance of forces within 
the ANC. Hence the adoption of a neo-liberal macro-economic policy. 
  
Chapter four: This chapter attempts to draw parallels between GEAR and 
structural adjustment programmes. It argues that, the difference in names 
notwithstanding, the macro-economic policy inputs of the policies are broadly 
identical, and therefore argues that GEAR’s results will be no different to the 
economic catastrophe that has been attributed to structural adjustment 
programmes in sub-Saharan Africa over the last decade and a half. 
 
Chapter five: This is the concluding chapter of the thesis. It summarises the 
arguments of the study.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
THE CASE FOR DEVELOPMENTALISM 
 
“ The wealth of a nation is its people. And the purpose of development is 
to create an enabling environment for people to enjoy long, healthy and 
creative lives. This simple but powerful truth is too often forgotten in the 
pursuit of material and financial wealth”. 
             - Human Development Report, 1999. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The beginning of the 1980s left an indelible imprint on the history and the study 
of international political economy. The period could perhaps also be regarded as 
having been one of the most controversial yet. The state, once seen as the 
provider of basic necessities and security, suddenly gave way to a supposedly 
omniscient new agent, the market. Since the end of the cold war, the market was 
held up as an efficient agent for growth and the redistribution of wealth and 
income. Even developing countries were fed with the gospel that the market is an 
objective natural occurrence. 
 
This chapter attempts to confront this view of the market. We refer to  this 
uncritical view of the market as market fundamentalism. The chapter argues that 
the dominance of the market is only a recent development of the last decade of 
the twentieth century. Furthermore, when markets dominate, even if for a brief 
period, they court disaster. Thus, the chapter makes a case for development to 
be led by the state. 
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MARKET FUNDAMENTALISM 
 
Since the end of the cold war in the 1980s, a consensus – known as the 
“Washington Consensus’ or neo-liberalism – which deemed the role of the state 
in the economy to be archaic and evil, emerged in the United States (US). 
According to the Nobel Prize - winning economist of the US, Milton Friedman 
(1982), an expanded role of the state produced a ‘Frankenstein’ which 
threatened the freedom of individuals. Thus, it was argued that economic growth 
became stunted in circumstances where power was centralised in the state 
(Pereira, Maraval and Przewoski, 1993). Friedman argued therefore that the role 
of the state in a capitalist economy was to only establish and enforce the ‘rules of 
the game’.  
 
In contradistinction, the market was held up as an efficient mechanism for 
producing growth and redistributing wealth and income. Adam Smith (1776), who 
is regarded as the father of classical economists, argued as early as the 
eighteenth century that growth was brought about by the division of labour. This 
then encouraged specialisation by workers and the allocation of certain 
productive duties to specific industries. The division of labour enhanced the skills 
of workers and caused time to be saved. Smith also argued that the division of 
labour was limited by the size of the market only. Free trade therefore had to be 
encouraged in order to expand the market and assist the division of labour. 
Finally, Smith contended that regardless of their self-interests, individuals 
redistributed income and wealth through an ‘invisible hand’: 
 
“ As every individual, therefore, endeavours as much as he 
can to employ his capital in the support of domestic industry, and 
so to direct that industry that its produce may be of the greatest 
value; every individual necessarily labours to render 
the annual revenue of the society as great as he can. He 
       generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the public interest,  
nor knows how much he is promoting it. By preferring the support of 
domestic to that of foreign industry, he intends only his own 
security; and by directing that industry in such a manner as its 
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produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, 
and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by 
an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his 
intentions. Nor is it always the worse for the society that it was no 
part of it. By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that 
of society more effectively than when he really intends to promote 
it. I have never known much good done by those who affected to 
trade for the public. It is an affectation, indeed, not very common 
among merchants, and very few words need be employed in 
dissuading them from it ”. (Smith, 1776: 423). 
 
 
Two hundred years later, F. A. Hayek (1976) reiterated the same views. He also 
emphasised the assumption that the market is an objective and natural 
occurrence which benefited human beings by guiding their actions: 
  
  “ The order (of the market) serves our ends not merely, as 
  all orders does, by guiding us in our actions and by bringing 
  about a certain correspondence between the expectations of 
the different persons, but also, in a sense which we must now 
make more precise, by increasing the prospects or chances of 
every one of a greater command over the various goods (i.e com- 
modities and services) than we are able to secure in any other  
way ”. (Hayek, 1976: 107). 
      
These assumptions about the inherent efficiency and the objectivity of the 
market, are what we refer to as market fundamentalism. Fundamentalism is used 
to imply the deep-seated but uncritical conviction that there is no alternative to 
the market. 
 
The argument for the efficiency of the market runs counter to the logic of the 
market itself. Marx (quoted in Turner (1978)) argued that the capitalist system 
was beset by a crisis of ‘over-production’. This, he explained, was the result of 
the logic of the market itself; namely the accumulation of profit: 
 
“ The capitalist’s immediate object in selling, is to turn his 
commodity or rather his commodity capital, back into mon- 
ey capital, and thereby realise his profit. Consumption – 
revenue – is by no means the guiding motive in this process, 
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although it is for the person who only sells commodities in  
order to transform them into means of subsistence. But this 
is not capitalist production, in which revenue appears as the  
result and not as the determining process. Everyone sells 
first of all in order to sell, that is to say, in order to transform  
commodities into money ”. (Marx in Turner, 1978: 446)  
     
Capitalist producers thus find it impossible to limit production to supply only those 
consumers who have the capacity to pay. For Polanyi (1944) such crises are the 
result of the market being a ‘self-regulating system’ which subordinates 
everything to itself: 
   
“ The market pattern, on the other hand, being related to a peculiar 
motive of its own, the motive of truck or barter, is capable of crea-  
ting a specific institution, namely, the market. Ultimately, that is 
why the control of the economic system by the market is of over- 
whelming consequence to the whole organisation of society: it means  
no less than the running of society as an adjunct to the market. Instead 
ad of economy being embedded in social relations, social relations  
are embedded in the economic system. The vital importance of the  
economic factor to the existence of society precludes any other  
result. For once the economic system is organised in separate insti- 
tutions, based on specific motives and conferring a special status, 
society must be shaped in such a manner as to allow that system  
to function according to its own laws. This is the meaning of the 
familiar assertion that a market economy can function only in a 
market society.” (Polanyi, 1944: 57). 
 
Besides, because the market is ‘self-regulating’, it can only engender ‘unequal 
development’ instead of reversing it. Samir Amin (1976) demonstrates this case 
through an analysis of relations between the ‘centre’ – the industrialised nations - 
and the ‘periphery’ – the less industrialised nations of the South such as Latin 
America and Africa. In this relationship, the former, by virtue of its development, 
appropriates to itself activities which require highly skilled labour and 
technological research and innovation. The latter then becomes reduced to an 
exporter of raw materials. Inside the periphery, this distinction is reproduced 
through the unequal distribution of income. 
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Secondly, the assumption that the market is natural is demonstrated as false by 
Marx (1938). He argued that proletarianisation was not the product of some 
natural phenomenon, but rather of state intervention. This happened in the 
fifteenth century after peasants were forcefully dispossessed of their lands by the 
commercial bourgeoisie. Throngs of peasants were thus thrown into the streets 
and some became ‘vagabonds’. Then the state enacted legislation which made it 
a punishable offence to be found without work. Marx (1938: 738) therefore wrote 
that: 
  
“. . . the historical movement which changes the  
producers into wage-workers, appears, on the one hand, as  
their emancipation from serfdom and from the fetters of the  
guilds, and this side alone exists for our bourgeoisie historians. 
But, on the other hand, these new freedmen became sellers  
of themselves only after they had been robbed of all their own 
means of production, and of all guarantees of existence affor- 
ded by the old feudal arrangements. And the history of this,  
their expropriation, is written in the annals of mankind in letters 
of blood and fire ”.   
  
The social construction of the market for the selling of ‘labour-power’ was 
however only the beginning. The market for goods was established through long 
distance trade (Polanyi, 1944) at the insistence of the commercial bourgeoisie. 
 
Still, the market never became a predominant feature of pre-capitalist societies 
(Rubin, 1979). From the twelfth to the fifteenth century, for instance, a ‘regional 
economy’ applied. In this mode of production, peasants produced mainly for their 
own consumption. The residue was then paid to landlords as rent and the rest 
sold on market days. In the towns too, where trade and commerce was blooming, 
craftsmen formed guilds to protect their products. 
 
The regional economy declined and was replaced by mercantilism from the 
sixteenth to the seventeenth century. Mercantilism emerged when long-distance 
trade developed between Western Europe and the East. A formidable state was 
then required to protect and monopolise trading routes. An alliance therefore 
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between the state and merchants came to be  developed. Mercantilist writers too, 
advocated state intervention throughout this period. Thus, Rubin (1979: 36) 
observes that: 
 
 
“ These were not armchair scholars. . . dedicated to the discussion 
of abstract theoretical problems. . . they were concerened . . . as 
practical men who sought to influence the course of economic life 
by enlisting the active assistance of the state ”.     
 
After the beginning of the Industrial Revolution in Britain at the end of the 
eighteenth century and about the same time that Smith wrote his Wealth of 
Nations in 1776, attempts were made in England to introduce a laissez faire 
government (Hobsbawm, 1969). Classical economists and the emerging 
industrial capitalists aimed at reversing the mercantilist policies of intervention 
and social policies. They demanded a smaller government and the reform of the 
monetary system in order to give the central bank a monopoly over monetary 
policy. The period of laissez-faire government was however very brief. It was 
ended by the 1929 Great Depression and the stock market crash. After this, state 
intervention was increased. In the United States, especially, the welfare state 
was introduced as a response to the crisis (Galbraith, 1987: 210). Under the 
welfare state, a Social Security Act was promulgated which provided 
compensation for unemployment and a compulsory pension plan for the aged. 
 
Further, the British economist, John Maynard Keynes (1936), provided the 
intellectual underpinnings of state intervention by arguing for the regulation of the 
market to guarantee ‘full employment’. He criticised classical economists for 
subjecting employment to the laws of supply and demand, in other words the 
market. He argued, in contrast, that competition, the costs of production, user 
costs and the imperfection of the markets all determined the prospects of either 
increasing or decreasing employment. To be sure, the levels of employment 
declined when the profits of capitalist producers came under threat, whether 
through changes in the production structure or declining levels of productivity. 
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Keynes therefore proposed an alternative in order to ensure ‘full employment’. 
He argued that ‘full employment’ could be achieved by raising the demand for 
labour. For this purpose, wages needed to be increased in order to stimulate 
consumption. Furthermore, Keynes proposed that as employment increased, the 
government would need to invest in the building of infrastructure and to regulate 
private investments. Thus, Keynes (1936: 320) asserted that: 
 
 “ In conditions of laissez faire the avoidance of wide fluctuations 
 in employment, may, therefore, prove impossible without a far- 
reaching change in the pyschology of investment markets such as 
there is no reason to expect. I conclude that the duty of ordering the  
current volume of investment cannot safely be left in private hands”. 
  
 After the end of the Second World War, government intervention was not 
abandoned. In fact, a compromise was reached for state intervention to exist 
alongside the promotion of free trade. This compromise was reflected in the 
objectives of the World Bank (also known as the International Bank of 
Reconstruction and Development) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
The two institutions were formed in 1944 by the victors of the war. The function of 
the IMF was to help stabilise exchange rates and that of the World Bank was to 
help fund the reconstruction of war-torn economies (Bello, 1998).  Thus, Brett 
(1985: 63 – 4) argues that: 
 
  “ This happy result was the outcome of an immensely complex  
  balancing act managed principally by the USA, and involving a   
a series of compromises in which it used its economic strength 
to provide short-term inducements to the weaker countries to 
co-operate, in exchange for a long-term commitment to libera- 
lisation into the structure of the institutions themselves. Thus,  
the post-war period can be seen as one involving the practice 
of protectionism and managed trade while establishing mecha- 
nisms required to sustain a long-term transition to one based  
on free trade ”. 
 
This context then gave rise to the emergence of ‘late industrialisers’ in the 1950s, 
namely, Germany and Japan. Both of these two countries relied for their rapid 
growth strategies on what Brenner (1998: 64 – 92) called a ‘high degree of state 
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control over the economy’. In Japan, for instance, the state controlled credit 
facilities, provided investment funds for targeted industries and shielded capital 
markets from foreign penetration. The strategies established Japan as one of the 
leading economies and a successful innovator in terms of technology. Brenner 
(1998: 76) then concluded that: 
 
“ Only by virtue of its economic institutions and the intervention of 
the state was the Japanese economy able to exploit the extra-
ordinary opportunities offered by the world, and particularly US 
demand, throughout the length of the post-war boom ”. 
 
THE RISE OF NEO-LIBERALISM 
  
Towards the end of the 1970s, a group of orthodox economists, the monetarists, 
gained ascendency in the debates about macro-economic policy. It appears that 
the background was provided by the recession of most of the European 
economies. The monetarists advanced the theory that the crisis was caused by 
the increased quantities of money following expanded levels of government 
spending during the post-war period (Friedman, 1953; Friedman and Friedman, 
1980). They then campaigned for (a) a reform of the monetary and banking 
system to quell interference in the money supply and (b) a reform of fiscal policy 
by governments. Following some profound changes in production in the 1980s 
and the restructuring of capital, another group of orthodox economists, the neo-
classicals, argued for the liberalisation of trade. They argued that the integration 
of national economies which was implied by the changes (see UNDP, 1999) 
necessitated the liberalisation of trade in order to expand markets (Wolf, 1997). 
Thus, began the rise of neo-liberalism. 
 
Neo-liberalism was propelled by the role which the IMF and the World Bank 
assumed in the 1980s. The role of the IMF and of the World Bank, especially, 
marked the ‘assault on state-assisted capitalism’ according to Walden Bello 
(1998: 218). This objective was achieved through the imposition of structural 
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adjustment programmes which entailed the privatisation of state assets, 
liberalisation of trade, devaluation of currencies and constraints on wages. 
Furthermore, with the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the 
WTO’s predecessor, the IMF and the World Bank made governments 
accountable to international agencies regarding trade liberalisation, and 
exchange rate stability. Thus, Cox (1992: 27) argues that these institutions 
marked an important turning point in the history of the world economy. They 
introduced the: 
  
“. . . subordination of domestic economies to the perceived  
exigencies of a global economy. States willy nilly became 
more effectively accountable to a ne’buleuse personified as 
the global economy; and they were constrained to mystify  
this external accountability in the eyes and ears of their own 
publics through the new vocabulary of globalisation, 
interdependence, and competitiveness ”.  
  
For developing countries, the changes in the world economy and the 
predominance of neo-liberalism impacted therefore on the context of 
development (Stallings, 1995). The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 was also 
of historic importance in these developments. For with that collapse, an 
alternative source of support for developing countries was lost. In the advanced 
capitalist countries too, the dominance of neo-liberalism forced a rethink of 
development. Some, like Sweden, embarked on a ‘social democratic’ experiment 
– hoping to tread a course between market fundamentalism and socialism.  
 
The predominance of neo-liberalism in the 1980s was indeed a revolution. Even 
erstwhile communists were converted to believe in the market. In addition, a 
challenge to market fundamentalism was seen as a demonstration of clinging to 
old-fashioned ideas which were no longer relevant. Market fundamentalism was 
taken for granted so much so that it was argued that we had come to the ‘end of 
history’ (Fukuyama, 1992). 
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Meanwhile, neo-liberal theorists argued that the changes in the world economy 
brought about ‘mutual benefits’ for all the actors involved (Keohane and Nye, 
1989; 1998). It was argued that globalisation, firstly, reduced the use of force in 
international politics and, secondly, it reduced the costs for cross-border 
transactions and facilitated the acquisition of information. Regarding the 
formulation of policy by governments, Keohane et al insisted that globalisation 
did not limit the scope of policy making by governments. They argued that 
governments were only limited by the need to remain credible.  
 
Critics pointed out however that as neo-liberalism aimed at ‘rolling back the 
state’, the vulnerable groupings of society have become exposed to a number of 
risks such as Hiv/Aids, violence against women and children especially, and 
crime (UNDP, 1999; Strange, 1996). The infrastructural needs of communities, 
such as transport, communications and water drains have also suffered, 
including the protection of the environment. Low income groups have also been 
exposed to markets and the participation of people in decision making processes 
has been steadily eroded (Vilas, 1997). 
 
Richard Higgott (1999) also points to a contradiction in neo-liberalism. He argues 
that states assist neo-liberal demands by enforcing wage restraints, reallocating 
taxation from conglomerates, conferring property rights and establishing 
authoritative legal and political structures. Furthermore,  Gregory Albo (1997) 
criticised the ‘social democratic’ approach by arguing that it represents nothing 
else but an ‘alternate route converging in neo-liberalism’. He points out that the 
social democratic economic policy is premised on an acceptance of the 
internationalisation of production, but hopes to overcome its negative 
consequences by, firstly, reforming the labour market and improving trade flows 
and competitiveness. The foregoing attempts are made to increase productivity 
and output. Secondly, social democratic economic policy proposes the 
development of new products which can be released into the market as quickly 
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as possible so as to take advantage of the shifts in terms of profit between 
countries. Albo (1997: 18) argued however that: 
 
  “ Shaped trade advantage to improve external competitiveness 
  in the hope that trade growth will overcome internal obstacles to 
high employment is no substitute for national and local employment 
policies to constrain the capitalist market”. 
 
Meanwhile, neo-liberalism was dealt a blow by the Southeast Asian crisis of 
1997. Here the collapse of the stock markets in one country, namely Taiwan, 
precipitated a ‘domino effect’ which quickly engulfed the whole region. The crisis 
spread also to other economies and affected mainly the so-called emerging 
markets. Significant amounts of wealth was lost and the repercussions acutely 
affected the social sectors. The crisis was another manifestation that unbridled 
market forces are capable of generating a severe crisis. 
 
Importantly too, the recognition that unbridled market forces generate crises 
came also from none other than the former architecs of neo-liberalism. James 
Wolfensohn and Joseph Stiglitz (1999), the former the president of the World 
Bank and the latter its chief economist, argued for a ‘comprehensive approach’ in 
development in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis: 
 
  “ The old approach of an exclusive focus on growth as the  
  elixir of all the world’s problems is thus too circumscribed. 
  Such a trickle down approach ignores the substantial social 
gains from growth directed towards the poor. In other words, 
the quality of economic development – not just its existence – 
can be important ”.       
 
 
The statement is therefore indicative of a growing consensus which questions the 
basic conviction of neo-liberalism. Ben Fine (1999) illustrates this development 
with the argument that :  
 
“ From anti-market, through market conforming, to market-friendly, 
the state is now seen more positively if cautiously so. The analytical 
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agenda is shifting from one based on a simple dichotomy between 
market and state as good and bad, respectively”. 
 
These arguments point to the direction of bringing the state back in, meaning, the 
idea of a minimalist state has indeed  been discredited. 
 
A CASE FOR DEVELOPMENTALISM. 
 
Developmentalism symbolises a concern for the people. It involves the reduction 
of poverty, meeting the basic needs of the people and at the same time granting 
them their freedom (Streak, 1997). Developmentalism is only possible under a 
developmental state, that is a state which establishes and pursues clear social 
goals.  
 
Adrian Leftwich (1994: 378 - 381) highlights, amongst others, the following 
characteristics of a developmental state: 
 
a) relative autonomy: the bureaucracy of a developmental state and the 
institutions of the state become insulated from the pressures of special 
interest groups. 
 
b)  purposeful political domination by elites: powerful and determined elites 
shape and monitor the objectives of the state. 
 
Hence, he argues that in a developmental state: 
 
“… the form and distribution of power, and the manner 
of its  use in and through the state, are critical for devel- 
opment ” (Leftwich, 1994: 377). 
 
Such a state establishes for itself certain social and economic goals which it 
meets by encouraging amongst other things co-operation with the private sector. 
There are, of course, also some negative features of a developmental state such 
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as its role in weakening the institutions of civil society and their repression. The 
importance of a developmental state nonetheless, argues Leftwich (1994: 382), 
is that it establishes the ‘primacy of politics and the state in development’.          
  
The argument about the importance of politics in development is also being 
made by Boris Kagarlitsky (1999). He argues that the purpose of gaining control 
over the reins of the state is to change power relations: 
 
  “ For the left, the whole point of conquering power must be to 
  change the rules of the game, and at the same time to  
  destroy the present complex of relations between national 
  governments and international financial and political institutions”. 
  (Kagarlitsky, 1999: 298). 
 
Kagarlitsky underlines this argument by pointing out that  ‘ . . . the question of the 
state has always been above all a question of power. . . ‘  It follows therefore that 
a developmental state entails the reversal of the tendencies to assist neo-
liberalism on the one hand and a concern for its constituency on the other.  
 
That this is possible even in the context of globalisation was effectively 
demonstrated by the governments of East Asian countries, the newly 
industrialised countries (NICs), namely, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan. 
These countries surprised advanced capitalist countries by rapidly industrialising 
their economies. This helped to eradicate poverty and improved the living 
standards of poor people (Kim, 1995). According to Robert Wade (1990), these 
results were achieved through the expanded role of the state. The state 
controlled credit, which helped it direct investment subordinate financial capital  
to its development goals; the state also promoted specific industries and 
protected the domestic economy from foreign competition1. Thus Wade (1990: 
342) argues that;   
                                                        
1 Initially, the role of the state in industrialising Asia was disputed by neo-liberal thinkers; see for example, 
Simpson, E. (1994) The Developing World: An introduction. Longman Scientific and Technical. Essex. 
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“Government resources and influences have prompted  
investments to be undertaken which  would not have 
been undertaken in strictly FM (free market) or SFM 
(simulated free market) conditions, thereby generating 
production and investment outcomes different from what 
would have happened if government had not intervened in 
this way.” 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The  purpose of this chapter was to confront  market  fundamentalism. It did so 
through an analysis of the key assumptions behind the ideology of neo-
liberalism. The predominance of neo-liberalism in the 1980s forced many 
governments in the South, including some writers on the left, to change their 
views about the involvement of the state in the economy. With the symbolic 
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, the triumph of neo-liberalism was even 
celebrated as the beginning of the end of history. The implications were that 
history would henceforth be written as only the history of the market.  
 
But many of the assumptions about the market were accepted rather uncritically. 
In particular, it was accepted without any serious questioning that the market 
produces and redistributes goods and services efficiently. Further, the market 
was held up as a natural phenomenon which functions in the same way as the 
laws of gravity.  
 
Contrary to these assumptions, this chapter asserts that the market produces 
uneven development. In addition, market forces have never dominated societies 
for any length of time. When they did dominate, even if for a short period, they 
                                                                                                                                                                     
An interesting and useful review of these views is in Kiely, R. (1998) ‘Neo-liberalism Revisited? A Critical 
Account of World Bank Concepts of Good Governance and Market Friendly Intervention’.In Capital and 
Class, 64, Spring. 
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produced a crisis. The implications of this argument for developing countries is 
that development has to be led by the state. In this context, leaders of the 
developing countries are urged to consider development not only as an economic 
exercise but a real practice of people – oriented governance. After-all, this is 
what used to be in the creed of most national liberation movements, including 
South Africa’s main liberation movement and governing party, the African 
National Congress (ANC).  
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         CHAPTER TWO 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
   FROM THE FREEDOM CHARTER  TO THE RDP. 
 
   “ We must by liberating ourselves, make our own history. 
   Such a process by its nature imposes on the activist the  
   necessity to plan and therefore requires the ability to mea- 
   sure cause and effect; the necessity to strike in the correct  
   direction and hence the requirement to distinguish between 
   essence and phenomenon; the necessity to move millions of  
   people as one to actual victory and consequently the develop- 
   ment of the skill of combining the necessary and the possible”. 
    
   - Thabo Mbeki (1999) Africa, The Time Has Come. Tafelberg. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The following chapter deals with the conceptualisation of a developmental vision 
by South Africa’s governing liberation movement, the African National Congress 
(ANC). It focuses on the origins of that vision from the Freedom Charter in 1955 
to 1994 when the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) was 
adopted as official government policy. The chapter argues that from 1955 to 
1994 the ANC maintained the consistency of its vision by articulating state-led 
development. This is all the more remarkable in the light of the fact that ANC 
economic policy came under intense pressure and criticism in the 1980s. 
 
THE ORIGINS OF THE FREEDOM CHARTER 
 
Within the ANC, a developmental vision for a post-apartheid South Africa has its 
origins in the Freedom Charter of 1955. In 1953, Professor Z. K Matthews, 
President of the ANC in the Cape Province, urged the ANC to convene a mass 
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gathering of all races. He called this a ‘Congress of the People’ whose objective 
was to draw up the Freedom Charter. A national conference of the ANC which 
was held in Queenstown, during the same year, approved the idea. In 1954, the 
National Action Council (NAC) was formed to make preparations for the 
Congress of the People. The NAC consisted of five representatives from each of 
the sponsoring organisations, namely, the South African Indian Congress, the 
South African Coloured People’s Organisation, and the South African Congress 
of Democrats. Representatives from the South African Council of Trade Unions 
(SACTU) were included after the trade union movement was formed in 1955. 
Additional invitations were sent to other organisations to join the NAC, including 
the Liberal Party (Karis et al, 1977).  
  
Before the Congress of the People took place, hundreds of volunteers were 
recruited and despatched to collect grievances and demands from factories, 
mine compounds, in the streets and from houses. Major rallies were also 
organised. During the campaign for the Freedom Charter, ANC branches and the 
NAC were overwhelmed by the demands that were collected for inclusion in the 
Charter (Lodge, 1983). According to Suttner and Cronin (1986), the popular 
demands were submitted mostly by women and workers. Workers demanded the 
right to form trade unions and the right to a ’40 hour’ working week. Through their 
organisation, the Federation of South African Women (FEDSAW), women 
submitted demands for maternity leave, equality, an end to poverty, houses and 
free and compulsory education for children. Land was also a popular demand 
including the lowering of the rent and the provision of recreation facilities.  
 
Finally, the Congress of the People was held for two days from 25th – 26th June 
1955. It attracted 3 000 delegates (Lodge, 1983). Representatives for whites, 
Indians, and coloureds were also present. The discussion of the demands during 
the Congress of the People took a democratic form. According to Lodge, a 
written statement for each of the collected demands (these were summaries by 
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the NAC) was read out, after which comments or a discussion was permitted. 
This was followed by the approval of the demands by a show of hands. 
 
The approved demands which were then formulated into a document called the 
Freedom Charter called for a complete transformation of the political, economic 
and social order in South Africa. In its preamble, the Charter declared a common 
citizenship for both blacks and whites. It argued that democratisation had to be 
based on the ‘will of the people’ (ANC, 1985: 1): 
 
 “ We, the people of South Africa, declare for all our country 
and the world to know that South Africa belongs to all who 
live in it, black and white, and that no government can  
justly claim authority unless it is based on the will of all the  
people”.   
  
The Charter then asserted that ‘the people shall govern’. It conferred equal rights 
to all national groups, equality for all before the law and undertook that a new 
government would uphold and protect human rights. Regarding socio-economic 
matters, the Charter promised a ‘forty-hour working week’ and a minimum wage 
for workers. Land was to be redistributed to help end poverty in rural areas 
especially. Furthermore, a ‘preventive health scheme’ run by the state was 
proposed and free medical care for women and children. Compulsory, free 
education was also promised, as well as houses, transport, roads, lighting and 
recreation facilities. The main economic demand of the Charter called for the 
redistribution of wealth and income. The Charter proposed that such an objective 
could be met through nationalisation and the intervention of the state in trade: 
  
“An ANC government shall restore the wealth of our country,  
the heritage of all South Africans, to the people as a whole. 
The mineral wealth beneath the soil, the banks and monopoly  
industry shall be transferred to the ownership of the people as 
a whole. All other industry and trade shall be controlled to assist 
the well-being of the people”. (ANC, 1985: 2)  
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After the Charter was adopted, Nelson Mandela (1956), praised it as a 
‘revolutionary document’ which served as a ‘beacon to the Congress Movement 
and an inspiration to the people of South Africa’. SACTU’s Billy Nair, also 
welcomed the document and argued that it represented the interests of workers 
(cited in Suttner and Cronin, 1986) even though it also accommodated other 
classes. Besides, it was recognised that the Charter was not a blueprint for 
socialism (ANC: 1985).  
 
Africanists within the ANC stirred a controversy when they accused the ANC of 
being influenced by communists according to Karis et al. Leaders of the Liberal 
Party who were also of the same view resigned from the NAC in January 1955. 
Nonetheless, the ANC approved and adopted the Charter at a special 
conference at the end of 1955. Again at the Morogoro Conference in Tanzania in 
1969, the ANC analysed the Charter and its objectives. The Charter was then 
declared a common programme of all the sections of the South African society. 
The ANC (1985: 6) also argued that the Charter provided an alternative to 
apartheid: 
 
 “ The Charter was not the statement of this or that section of the  
 population. It was a declaration of all the people of South Africa.  
It was a simple, honest, unpretentious document reflecting the  
desires and ideas of millions of common people. Therein lay the  
power of is revolutionary message. And always it should be borne  
in mind that both in its wording and intent the Charter projected the  
view not of present day South Africa but that of the country as it  
should and will be after the victory of the revolution ”.         
  
 
In the late 1970s and into the 1980s the Charter became the major instrument of 
mobilisation and the basic framework of the ANC’s vision of post–apartheid 
South Africa. Through the United Democratic Front (UDF) – an umbrella body for 
a large number of anti-apartheid organisations in the 1980s – the ANC 
hegemonised the vision of the Charter2 (see Marx, 1992: 114 - 146).  Leaders of 
the UDF committed themselves to pursue the aims of the Charter from the 
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launch of the organisation in 1983. In 1987, the UDF formally adopted the 
Charter and so did the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), 
South Africa’ s largest trade union federation, which also became an ally of the 
ANC. COSATU argued that the Charter consisted of the ‘. . . minimum demands 
which lays the basis for a non-exploitative society’ (Work In Progress, 1987: 11). 
Lastly, the Charter was also well received by national student organisations such 
as the Congress of South African Students (COSAS) and the Azanian Students 
Congress (AZASCO).     
   
THE POST – APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA (PASA) DEBATES 
 
Outside of the ANC in the 1960s – 70s, there was a notable absence of 
contributions by South African economists appraising the Charter. To be sure, 
ANC economic policy was rarely mentioned in the literature. However, the 
changing balance of forces internationally in the mid–1980s engendered new 
interest in the ANC and its policies. This gave rise to what has become known as 
the post-apartheid South Africa (PASA) debates3. The debates reflected varied 
concerns differing along ideological lines about the outlook of a future economic 
policy for South Africa. From about 1985, the media ran coverages which 
exposed the views of prominent ANC leaders to the public. South African 
businessmen also made trips to Lusaka to meet with ANC leaders. Di Paice 
(1990) argued that business sought to persuade the ANC to accept that 
redistribution could happen without nationalisation and that, as in the former 
Soviet Union, central planning was bound to fail. Business was aware that the old 
edifice was crumbling.    
 
These views also found strong resonance within the academic literature. Terence 
Moll (1988) argued that government intervention in the economy was 
unsustainable as it exacerbated macro-economic instability. He denounced 
government intervention as a sign of populism. Moll’s conclusions were based on 
                                                                                                                                                                     
2 The ANC was still banned at the time whilst the UDF operated legally within the country. 
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an examination of the development initiatives of Latin American countries. These 
countries revealed similar patterns to South Africa concerning the distribution of 
wealth, and the economic structure. In addition, Latin American economies faced 
macro-instability after the Second World War. The governments of the countries 
which were affected adopted policies which increased their intervention in the 
economy. The policies entailed restrictions on the import of luxury goods, 
induced governments to favour the local manufacturing sector and the small 
scale agricultural sector; controls were also placed on the productive structure of 
the economy and the government directed investments. 
 
After a brief period which promised both redistribution and growth, macro-
instability returned. Then Latin American governments requested assistance from 
the IMF and adopted anti-labour policies. Moll’s conclusion therefore was that a 
new South African government could learn from Latin America. He argued that 
the alternative for the government was to institute a selective land reform 
programme, implement selective taxation and negotiate a wage restraint with 
workers for the short-term.  
 
Furthermore, the views against redistribution gained a different emphasis in the 
light of the recession in the 1980s. Nicoli Nattrass (1992) argued that the 
economic crisis was the result of investments having dried up. She viewed the 
challenge which faced a new government as the need to encourage the return of  
‘investor confidence’ (Nattrass, 1992; 1995). For that she suggested that the 
government needed to stabilise the macro-economy by persuading organised 
labour to accept wage restraints, restructure company tax and liberalise the 
economy. In addition, Nattrass argued that in South Africa, demand–led growth 
faced the constraints of a shortage of skilled labour and foreign exchange 
earnings. In effect, Nattrass advocated the well known structural adjustment 
policies of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
3 I am grateful to Dr. Ajulu for the reference to these debates. 
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Thus, throughout the negotiation process, there were consistent and determined 
efforts to crowd out the ANC’s Charter and its developmentalist approach. 
Moreover, in the aftermath of the collapse of the socialist camp and the end of 
the Cold War, liberal academics viewed discussions on economic policy as 
having been finally settled in favour of neo-liberalism. Hence, Robert Schrire 
(1992: 1) argued:  
 
 “ There is, however, no longer a genuine ‘economic debate’. 
With the demise of Marxist states such as the Soviet Union 
and East Germany, there is today a growing and near – uni- 
versal acceptance of the broad parameters for economic  
growth and the elimination of poverty. Effective markets, appro 
priate educational systems, public policies which encourage 
entrepreneurship and individual incentives, and relatively limit- 
ed but effective government are now considered essential  
elements of an efficient economy ”. 
 
 
Notwithstanding the intensity of these attacks by liberal academics and business 
on the Charter, ANC leaders consistently supported its aims. In addition, the 
struggles of the 1980s were seen to have been influenced by the vision of the 
Charter. Hence, the late Joe Slovo (1986) argued: 
  
“ The  main thrust and content of the immediate struggle continues to 
revolve around the Freedom Charter which provides for a minimum 
platform of a non–racial, united democratic South Africa based on the rule 
of the majority “.  
 
At the start of the negotiations between the ANC and the National Party (NP) 
government in 1990, Thabo Mbeki, now president of both the ANC and the 
Republic of South Africa, had also reiterated the ANC’s support for the Charter. 
He stated that: 
 
“ The new government would have to have sufficient economic 
strength to address the question of the quality of life, and 
something has to be done about the control and the distribution of 
wealth. Nationalisation is an important element in this ”. 
  (Van Niekerk, 1990) 
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Further, left leaning academics were also optimistic. They endorsed the policies 
of redistribution such as nationalisation, and argued that in these policies worker 
biased components of democratisation needed to be ensured (Davies: 1988). 
Above all, Robert Davies asserted that the structure of monopolies in the South 
African economy made nationalisation by a new government possible. Since 
1945, power had been centralised in a few conglomerates which also developed 
subsidiaries locally.  
 
Finally, left wing academics also had a different view of the origins of the 
recession in the 1980s. Saul and Gelb (1981) saw the crisis as a reflection of the 
failures of an economic system which excluded blacks. In other words racial 
capitalism. They cited as reasons for this failure, the job colour bar, the restriction 
of the movement of blacks through pass laws, and a segregated consumer 
market. The converse argument then was that there was a need to fundamentally 
restructure the economy according to Peter Moll (1991: 79): 
 
 “ What is of real interest is not how much the government can 
 distribute in one fell swoop but whether the economy itself can  
 be restructured in favour of the poor ”.   
 
ANC, COSATU, SACP IN THE PASA DEBATES  
 
The formation of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) in 
1985, and its adoption of the Charter in 1987 as part of the tripartite alliance, 
heralded a new dimension in the PASA debates. COSATU reinforced the 
SACP’s concerns with regard to these debates. As business and liberal 
academics expected a negotiated economic policy with the ANC, the labour 
movement intended that its alliance with the ANC should help bring socio-
economic transformation. It was theorised by the leaders of both the SACP and 
COSATU that workers had much to gain from the national liberation struggle. In 
its 1989 programme, the Path to Power, the SACP argued that; 
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  “ Oppressed by the special colonial form of bourgeois  
           domination in South Africa and super-exploited, black 
          workers stand to gain the most from the immediate  
          abolition of national oppression. It is also black workers 
          whose longer-term interests are for the complete and final 
          eradication of all forms of oppression and exploitation in 
 in our country ”. 
    
Both the SACP and COSATU favoured a ‘mixed economy which they argued laid 
the basis for ‘a future socialist South Africa. This point was eloquently put by 
Enoch Godongwana (1993: 86), then Acting General–Secretary of the National 
Union of Metal Workers of South Africa (NUMSA): 
 
“ In Sweden, the Social Democratic Party or social democratic 
theory had some legitimacy in society as a whole, whereas we are 
still struggling within our liberation movements to assert a clear 
class theory. This imposes on us the need to look at various forms 
of transition. We must begin, while we assert a leading role in 
various areas of society, to build certain alternatives within the 
capitalist framework which will tend to undermine the capitalist 
logic. In doing that, we cannot leave out the question of the state. 
As a class, the amount of public ownership and control by the state 
for the benefit of all of us is critical. Even if we are talking about the 
reconstruction programme, as we are doing in COSATU, you 
cannot simply  rely on market forces to carry it forward. You will still 
need some form of state intervention and the question of 
nationalisation becomes critical in that debate ”. 
      
Thus, workers were persuaded to accept that within the national liberation 
struggle the bridge-heads towards socialism could be built. As Joe Slovo (1988) 
put it: 
 
  “ If the working class emerges as the dominant social force 
            in a truly democratic post-apartheid state, the possibility is 
  clearly opened up of a peaceful progression towards  
socialism ”. 
 
Further, the ANC was affirmed as the leader of the national liberation struggle: 
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       “ The national liberation offensive is led by the African 
      National Congress in revolutionary alliance with the  
                 vanguard worker’s party – the South African Commun- 
      ist Party – and the South African Congress of Trade  
      Unions. It is a national liberation struggle that combines  
      many mass democratic contingents – the youth, women, 
      students, civic and others – and the trade union movement ”.      
 
Thus, it was thought that the labour movement would exert an influence on ANC 
economic policy and also receive a degree of favour (Gall, 1997). COSATU 
proposed therefore the establishment of research units which were to empower 
its members and those of the ANC. With the assistance of left wing academics, 
the initial research units that were established examined mostly the impact of 
sanctions and the delivery of social services (Padayachee, 1998). In the mid-
1980s, however, the scope of the research units was extended in order to 
examine industrial policy. The Economic Trends (ET) was established in 1986 
with Stephen Gelb as its Co-ordinator. It aimed at developing an understanding 
of the nature of the economic crisis which beset  South Africa in the 1980s. After 
Stephen Gelb resigned as the co-ordinator of ET, the Industrial Strategy Project 
was set up in 1990.  
 
Furthermore, COSATU organised a conference in 1991 wherein a Worker’s 
Charter was adopted. According to Devan Pillay (1991), workers listed demands 
such as a living wage, job security and free education. An alliance forum was 
formed to inform ANC economic policy. More broadly, the labour movement used 
its power to institutionalise its role in the post-apartheid period (Baskin, 1996) to 
help maintain the balance of forces in favour of the ANC. 
 
The ANC also established its own research unit, Economic Research on South 
Africa (EROSA) in 1989 to recommend specific policies. Then the Department of 
Economic Planning (DEP) was formed in 1990. With the help of the DEP, the 
Macro-economic Research Group (MERG), was formed in 1991. The MERG  
aimed at developing a ‘macro-economic policy framework’ for South Africa 
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(Padayachee,1998). Its work culminated in the writing of the book known as 
Making Democracy Work: A Framework for Macro-economic Policy in South 
Africa. A hallmark of the book was that it supported a developmental perspective 
by offering ‘Post-Keynesian’ theoretical arguments (Padayachee, 1998). 
 
Finally, as alliance partners, the ANC, COSATU and SACP affirmed the 
independence of each of these three organisations. They agreed however to 
criticise one another in open and frank debates. As the then President, Nelson 
Mandela, put it: 
 
  “ It is in the nature of an alliance that its partners will not 
  agree on all matters that fall within the broad vision that  
  binds them. What is important is the readiness to discuss 
  disagreements when they arise and the shared commitment 
  to find solutions ”.  
  (Mayibuye, 1997). 
 
After 1990, therefore, the ANC, SACP and COSATU co-operated in the matter of 
formulating policies. All three organisations participated in the formulation of the 
ANC’s Recommendations on Post-apartheid Economic Policy (1990), and the 
subsequent document, Ready To Govern (1992). The developmental 
perspectives that were enunciated in both documents did not differ from the 
Freedom Charter. Both argued for a developmental approach that was founded 
on the reality of South African conditions. The Recommendations on Post– 
apartheid Economic Policy document, for instance, stated its objectives thus: 
 
  “ The South African economy is in fundamental crisis. This 
  arises out of the distortions of the apartheid system, problems 
  in the sphere of domestic production and reproduction 
  and the changing and destabilising international environment. 
  It has not been able to meet the needs of the great mass of  
  the country’s people. Neither are current state and capital  
  strategies likely to alleviate poverty and mass deprivation… 
To achieve these goals, a non-racial and democratic state  
would follow an economic strategy that aims to achieve  
economic growth through a process of increasing equality in  
the distribution of incomes, wealth and economic power ”. 
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Further, the document argued in favour of a developmental state: 
 
“ Within the context of a mixed economy, the democratic non–racial 
state would assume the leading role in the reconstruction of the 
economy in order to facilitate the realisation of its developmental 
objectives”.  
 
The document proposed that reconstruction would be financed through domestic 
savings. It also proposed an increase in taxation for companies, the regulation of 
capital markets and the retention of exchange controls. In addition, it stated that 
foreign investment would be directed for purposes of employment creation. 
Further, it envisaged the development of a new industrial strategy which would 
be capable of meeting the basic needs of the people.  
 
The Ready To Govern document too, declared that its aims were to eliminate 
poverty, promote democratisation, encourage redistribution of income and initiate 
growth and development. Towards these objectives, the document proposed the 
establishment of community-based financial institutions, committed the ANC to 
the implementation of the recommendations of the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) regarding the labour market, promised the redistribution of 
resources to rural areas and the use of tariffs to protect domestic producers, 
including jobs. Finally, it argued that: 
 
  “ The democratic state will have ultimate responsibility – in 
  co-operation with the trade union movement, business and 
  other organs of civil society – for co-ordinating, planning and 
  guiding the development of the economy towards sustainable 
  economic growth patterns ”. (ANC, 1992: 12).    
 
As we can see, ANC economic policy was remarkably consistent from 1955 into 
the 1990s. It was against this background that the Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP) was born. At the instigation of the National 
Union of Mineworkers (NUM), an affiliate of COSATU, the tripartite alliance 
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debated a ‘Reconstruction Accord’ in 1993. The Accord was redrafted and 
submitted to the ANC’s 1994 Conference on Reconstruction and Strategy for 
discussion. The final product was the RDP which the conference adopted as the 
ANC’s manifesto for the first democratic general elections in 1994. The RDP was 
preceded at the conference by a number of workshops which included another 
ally of the ANC, the South African National Civic Organisations (SANCO). The 
participation of the civic organisations in the formulation of the RDP strengthened 
the perspective for ‘people-driven development’. SANCO (The African 
Communist, 1994: 26) argued that: 
 
“ People-driven development is more than communities simply 
agreeing to projects. It means they must take an active part in 
determining the very nature of the project, in designing it, and even 
in organising the construction work ”. 
  
 Thus, SANCO saw the recommendations for the establishment of local housing 
associations, village water committees and the Community Land Trust as 
concrete steps towards the realisation of people-driven development.  
 
Furthermore, the bottom-up character of the RDP was shown during the election 
campaign when the ANC hosted People’s Forums countrywide. During the 
forums, people discussed and endorsed the RDP. Thus, Steward (1997: 5) 
argued that the process of formulating the RDP ‘occurred largely without the 
participation of the top leadership, who were involved in negotiations, election 
preparations and the like’.  
 
Chris Heymans (1995) identified the main objectives of the RDP as follows:  
 
§ democratisation, 
§ meeting basic needs, 
§ the development of human and economic resources, and 
§ the management and monitoring of reconstruction and development. 
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The objectives of the RDP were identical to those of the Charter. In other words, 
the RDP became a logical conclusion of the Charter. This achievement came as 
a result of the balance of forces being maintained in favour of a developmental 
state.  
 
The RDP argued that the system of apartheid denied blacks access to basic 
services such as health, transport, electricity, education, water and housing. It 
also argued that the National Party regime undemocratically restructured the 
economy and introduced privatisation.  Restructuring led then to a structural 
crisis and rising poverty and unemployment (ANC, 1994: 75 – 78). To reverse the 
circumstances, the RDP then accorded the state a ‘leading and enabling role’ 
(Wolpe, 1995). In particular, the RDP envisaged that the state would lead 
reconstruction and development by building the infrastructure. This then provided 
the link between growth, development and reconstruction (ANC, 1994: 6); 
 
  “ The RDP integrates growth, reconstruction and   
  development. The key to this link is an infrastructural 
  programme that will provide access to modern and effective 
  services like electricity, water, telecommunications,  
transport, health, education and training for all our people ”.     
 
 
Furthermore, the RDP argued that growth was going to be achieved through the 
promotion of exports. 
 
In analysing the RDP, Bill Freund (1994: 36) argued that its proposals for 
economic restructuring were aimed at realistic and possible reconstruction and 
development. Thus, he stated: 
 
  “ Coverage here is broad, thorough and insightful. Analysis 
 flows from an integrated sense of SA (South Africas) 
developmental crisis – a ‘growth path’ that has lost way – and 
out of an awareness that a new road will depend on the  
achievement of social and economic goals. There is a realistic 
balance between private opportunity and state regulation as the 
means through which change can and must occur. It is in line 
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with international trends and does not place unrealistic hopes 
on an all-benevolent state ”. 
 
Other critics suggested that even though the RDP was laudable, it was short on 
specific details. In addition, Wolpe warned that the bureaucracy of the state was 
still unchanged and there was also the issue of the contestation of  policies by 
other classes. Phillip Dexter  (1995: 57) argued that the RDP was weak on the 
mechanisms of its implementation that it was considered to mean different things 
to different people. He therefore remarked that; 
 
“… every newspaper, journal, magazine, TV programme and radio 
slot that has anything to do with current affairs mentions the RDP. 
Some of them do it daily. Most major companies and the nine new 
provinces have their own RDPs and RDP staff. it has got so bad 
that American Swiss have their own RDP, the ‘Reduced Diamond 
Price’. In Cape Town beggars no longer ask for R1 for half a loaf of 
bread; they now want R1 towards the RDP. All of this demonstrates 
one thing, even if in a banal way, the RDP is different things to 
different people ”. 
 
In addition, Hein Marais (1994) reminded the left about the context within which 
the RDP was produced and was to be implemented such as the fact that the 
ANC had already signed an IMF Letter of Intent which committed the liberation 
movement to policies of macro-economic balance, the presence of the property 
clause in the constitution to prevent expropriation of land for redistribution and 
the conciliatory attitude of the leaders of the ANC towards its former enemies.  
 
From the perspective of the African Communist (1994: 1), a defence of the RDP 
was therefore seen as necessary. It argued that the RDP was a real achievement 
which in the light of its developmental character, the other classes sought to 
sabotage: 
 
  “ Our class opponents have failed to defeat us. They have  
  now been forced back into working within our Reconstruction 
  and Development Programme. But they are doing so with their 
own agenda – to dilute, to subvert and generally to frustrate our 
attempts to empower the majority of South Africans ”. 
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Finally, to implement the RDP appropriate structures at the national, provincial 
and local levels were established (Steward, 1997). At the national level an RDP 
Office was set up to initiate, manage and co-ordinate RDP projects with line 
departments. It was also to ensure the participation of civil society. A special 
RDP Fund was also introduced and Jay Naidoo, the former General Secretary of 
COSATU who was appointed as Minister without Portfolio to run the RDP Office. 
The National Institute of Economic Policy (NIEP) was commissioned to project 
the costs of the RDP4. In its report NIEP argued for a more comprehensive and 
integrated approach to financing the RDP (Business Mail, 1: 3, June 3 – 9, 1994). 
Its report stated that: 
 
  “ The RDP is not just a wish list of programmes to overcome 
  the legacy of centuries of apartheid oppression. It is essentially 
  a framework for setting in motion a sustainable and dyna- 
mic process of development based on reconstruction, redistri- 
bution and restructuring the economy. Therefore the quantification 
of the RDP cannot be based on the costing of a list of programmes 
which has to be added to the national accounts ”. 
 
NIEP proposed that the sources of funding for the RDP needed to come from 
enhanced tax collection, private sector contributions, and contributions by the 
parastatals. It also estimated that the RDP would cost the government R135 
billion. Towards this, the government received international financial assistance 
mainly from the European Union.    
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The focus of this chapter was the origin of a developmental vision in the ANC 
from the Freedom Chapter in 1955 to the RDP in 1994. The chapter argued that 
there was consistency in ANC economic policy from 1955 into 1990s. 
Consistency was maintained in the 1980s amidst intensified attacks by the forces 
of neo-liberalism.  
                                                        
4 NIEP was formerly known as MERG. 
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Perhaps, the two greatest assets which helped the ANC to maintain consistency 
in its economic policy in the 1980s were the mass support which it cultivated for 
the Freedom Charter and the role which both the SACP and COSATU played. 
The combination of these two factors was indeed responsible for the coherence 
and the consistency of the liberation movement through what was perhaps the 
single most critical period in the history of the liberation struggle. The decisive 
breakthrough in the struggle against apartheid came for the ANC at a time when 
a profound shift in terms of the balance of forces occurred internationally. Inside 
the country, liberal academics and business sought to capitalise on these shifts. 
They attempted to pressure the ANC to accept market fundamentalism by 
pointing to the changes internationally.  
 
The ANC chose instead to stay committed to the Freedom Charter. Hence, the 
RDP was adopted as a policy framework  for the government of the ANC. In all 
respects, the RDP was a mirror of the Freedom Charter. It was formulated not by 
technocrats or the so–called ‘experts’ but by the people and their organisations, 
which overwhelmingly voted the ANC into government in the 1994 elections. 
Further, as with the Charter, the starting point of the RDP was not the market or 
capital, but the poor. It is these two points which made the RDP so popular. In 
addition, the RDP received support from left-wing critics, although they were also 
critical of some of its short-comings. Above all, the adoption of the RDP gave the 
full promise that reconstruction and development was to begin at last. How these 
expectations were disappointed is the subject of the next chapter.   
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CHAPTER THREE 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
            THE SHIFT FROM RDP TO GEAR  
 
 “ I dreamed of a dream that defeated my imaginations. Yes I 
 dreamed. I dreamed of South Africa being led to freedom by  
 comrade Madiba, the first African President of democratic So- 
uth Africa. There was jubilation and ululations from the rainbow 
nation as he carried the candle stick of leadership and brought 
unity to different racial groups in our country. There was hope 
and life in the face of South Africa. However, the westerly winds 
soon blew out the candle stick in his hands and the darkness of  
confusion set in” 
 
        - Mike Mashabela, Umsebenzi. March, 1998  
  
INTRODUCTION 
      
The previous chapter dealt with the ANC economic policy vision from the Charter 
to the RDP. It demonstrated consistency in economic policy throughout the 
struggle until the first democratic elections in 1994. This chapter looks at the 
changes in economic policy from 1994 to 1996. In short, the shift from the RDP 
to GEAR. The chapter argues that these changes were caused by shifts in the 
balance of forces within the ANC. The first section of the chapter highlights 
developments since the adoption of the RDP. The second section looks at the 
macro-economic policy that was published by the ANC government and how it 
created tensions between the ANC and its alliance partners, the SACP and 
COSATU.  
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THE DEMISE OF THE RDP 
  
In the first democratic elections in 1994, the ANC popularised the RDP as its 
election manifesto. It proclaimed that through the RDP, it would create ‘ A Better 
Life For All’5. Before the elections the ANC was made aware of the fearsome 
backlog which the National Party regime had left behind. Thus, housing had a 
backlog of 1,3 million (ANC, 1994). Education and job creation were all 
highlighted by the ANC as priorities for the new government.  Moreover, studies 
had shown that South Africa had one of the most unequal distributions of income 
and wealth in the world (see Wilson and Ramphele, 1989).  
 
After the elections, which the ANC won with an overwhelming majority, the ANC 
government announced twenty two Presidential Lead Projects. The projects 
prioritised the East Rand townships which had been ravaged by violence during 
the years which preceded the first democratic elections and consisted, amongst 
other things, of the upgrading of taxi routes, the repairing of water and sewage 
systems, rebuilding of schools, the building of houses, the tarring of roads and 
the construction of community health care centres (Reconstruct, 1999). 
Meanwhile, Derek Keys, who was then the Minister of Finance, argued that the 
budget  was ‘. . . the primary source of finance of the reconstruction and 
development. . .’ (The Weekly Mail & Guardian, June 24 – 30, 1994).    
 
Four months into the government of national unity (GNU), the ANC released the 
RDP White Paper 6. The RDP White Paper proposed to ‘establish a policy-
making methodology and implementation strategy’ for the RDP (RSA: 1994). 
Further, the RDP White Paper adopted the RDP base document as a ‘policy 
framework’ for the GNU.  In contrast to the RDP base document, however, the 
RDP White Paper outlined its objectives as to ensure fiscal discipline and also to 
‘redefine’ the role of the government and the public sector. It argued that the 
                                                        
5 This was the slogan the ANC used in the 1994 elections. 
6 The government of national unity (GNU) consisted of the ANC, NP and Inkatha. It reflected the 
compromises which the ANC had to make during the negotiations for transition.   
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government had to reduce consumption expenditure since 60 percent of the 
same was for wages and restructure the public sector. Moreover, the RDP White 
Paper changed the emphasis of the RDP base document from ‘development with 
growth’ to ‘growth and development’, meaning growth was expected to trickle 
down. In the light of these propositions, Ben Fine (1995) criticised the RDP White 
Paper arguing that the  
 
“… RDP was being diminished both in its content and in the means 
to implement it”. 
 
But the most significant development after the publication of the RDP White 
Paper was perhaps the closure of the RDP Office in March 1996. The 
government argued that the closure was necessitated by the fact that key 
Ministries succeeded in integrating reconstruction and development into their 
own programmes and policies (South Africa Yearbook: 1997). It was then 
asserted that the role of the RDP Fund would be to channel international financial 
aid for RDP projects. The move to close the RDP Office was seen by 
commentators as an indication that the government had abandoned the RDP.     
 
In 1995, and as if to demonstrate that the RDP had not been abandoned, the 
government published yet another policy framework for municipalities, the Urban 
Development Strategy of the Government of National Unity (Ministry in the Office 
of the President: 1995).  The document argued that its aim was to assist 
reconstruction and development. It proposed, however, a framework for the 
transformation of South African cities and towns into ‘globally competitive 
national economies by 2020’. 
 
Meanwhile, the financing of the RDP posed a serious challenge to the 
government. At the ANC’s forty-ninth conference, former President Nelson 
Mandela, hinted to delegates that: 
 
  “ Our socio-economic problems are compounded by the 
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     fact of the serious economic crisis, and that the funds to 
  accelerate reconstruction and ensure economic growth  
are concentrated in a few white hands “. 
   
Subsequently, discussions within the ANC aimed to provide solutions to this 
challenge. A discussion document entitled The State and Social Transformation 
(1997) argued that the ANC inherited an almost bankrupt government from the 
NP. The document claimed that the NP regime used the budget to prolong its 
hold on power and thus caused the state to accumulate a huge debt. In the light 
of the debt and the interest that had to be paid on it, the document then argued 
that: 
 
  “ . . . it is important to note that costs will continue to increase 
  and accelerate as a percentage of the GDP unless the deficit 
  is brought down to sustainable levels ”. 
  (ANC, 1997: 42) 
 
Because government expenditure had to be limited in view of the debt, the 
document then identified the private sector as another important source for 
additional funds. For this purpose, the document proposed that the ANC should 
encourage a good relationship between labour and capital ‘ in the interest of 
social stability, economic progress, reconstruction and development’.  
Furthermore, it argued that: 
 
  “ . . . the democratic state has to attend to the genuine concerns 
  of all other social and national groups, it also has to attend to the 
concerns of private capital if it has to ensure industrial stability, 
sustainable economic growth and secure a political democracy. It 
has to try to balance different and at times conflicting interests 
whilst addressing the needs of the people over a wide variety 
of spheres ”. 
 
The document was quickly responded to by Nzimande and Cronin (1997) who 
criticised it for introducing a ‘balancing act’. In addition, the SACP (1996), warned 
against the view of economic restructuring which advocated the subordination of 
workers to the interests of capital. This was also in response to the Growth For 
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All Strategy of the South African Foundation (SAF) – an association of the top 
companies in South Africa7. According to Nattrass (1999), SAF argued for 
consistency in economic policy, the role of markets in economic growth, fiscal 
discipline, promotion of investor confidence, and the need for the government to 
act decisively and harshly in implementing its economic policy.  
 
The SAF strategy differed significantly from labour’s Social Equity and Job 
Creation (1996). In the latter document, the starting point of the labour movement 
was that the; 
 
 “ RDP calls for a programme to satisfy the basic needs of all 
South Africans. It calls for the development of our people. It 
calls for worker’s rights, and the building of the economy. These 
central pillars of reconstruction in the RDP should be given  
concrete expression ”. 
 
In other words, the labour movement placed at the forefront of economic 
restructuring the eradication of poverty. It proposed a demand-led economy in 
which the government was to provide jobs through infrastructural projects, a 
redistributive fiscal policy which would help to fund a national health scheme, the 
breaking of monopolies and the promotion of social equity. 
 
A full discussion of all these perspectives was however superceded by 
developments in the economy. In May 1996 the rand crashed by 20 percent 
against the U.S dollar. According to the Financial Mail, the consumer price index 
rose by 6.3 percent and banks increased their prime lending rates to over 13 
percent. The collapse of the rand was interpreted by economists as an indication 
that investors were unhappy about the macro-economic environment within 
South Africa. Against this background, the SACP (The African Communist, 1996) 
cautioned that the rand was being ‘used as an opportunity to make all kinds of 
ideological pronouncements’.  
                                                        
7 For a critique of this strategy see Adelzadeh, A. , Moolla, Z and Pillay, V. (1996) Growth for Some, 
Poverty for the Rest. Mayibuye. April.   
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Notwithstanding the warning, the government in panic unveiled the macro-
economic policy known as Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) in 
June 1996. In addition, GEAR was declared ‘non-negotiable’ by Trevor Manuel, 
the ANC’s Minister of Finance. The strategy aimed at creating a ‘competitive fast-
growing economy’ which would provide 400 000 jobs per annum (Department of 
Finance: 1996). It argued that the growth rate of the South African economy of 3 
percent per annum since the ANC became government, was not sustainable. 
The strategy proposed that its target for job creation would be met through the 
promotion and the acceleration of non-gold exports, an increase in private 
investments, the restructuring of the public sector, and ‘greater labour market 
flexibility’. In addition, GEAR proposed to attract business confidence by limiting 
the fiscal deficit to 3 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) by the year 
2000. Taxes were also targeted to remain at 25 percent of the GDP (Budget 
Watch: 1996). 
  
However, GEAR’s growth projections and its target for the reduction of the fiscal 
deficit were described as arbitrary by Asghar Adelzadeh (1996), of the National 
Institute of Economic Policy. He also pointed out that the World Bank thought 
that a deficit of 12 percent was still sustainable and argued that the country had 
not experienced uncontrollable inflation in the last thirty years. Moreover, 
Aldezadeh criticised the strategy for raising the exports : GDP ratio to 25 percent  
saying that this was higher than in the OECD and East Asian countries. Finally, 
he argued that the growth targets of the strategy depended on the moderation of 
wages and the stimulation of private investment. Therefore, Aldezadeh 
concluded that: 
  
“ . . . the proposed framework and policy scenarios represented an 
adoption of the essential tenets and policy recommendations of the 
neo-liberal framework advocated by the IMF in its structural 
adjustment programmes ”. 
     
Furthermore, unlike the RDP, GEAR did not originate either from the ANC 
alliance or public  discussions. Its architects were seventeen ‘experts’, some of 
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whom were gathered from historically white universities including the 
international financial institutions, the South African Reserve Bank and the 
Development Bank of Southern Africa. Hence, Patrick Bond (1996: 23) argues 
that the models that the authors used in formulating GEAR, are those of the 
institutions mentioned above. 
 
Business and its mouth-piece, the Financial Mail (14/03/97), welcomed these 
shifts in ANC economic policy as indications of ‘consistency with IMF 
recommendations’. COSATU and the SACP, on the other hand, castigated the 
GEAR macro-economic policy as a ‘watering down of the RDP’  and stated that  
it was ‘anti-developmentalist’ (Mail & Guardian, June 20 – 26: 1997; COSATU: 
1998a). This then provoked a vigorous debate within the alliance which has 
continued unabated over the past three years. The central thrust of the criticism 
is that as the GEAR policy is essentially a home-grown version of the infamous 
IFI’s structural adjustment programmes, it was bound to circumscribe the role of 
the state in the economy, and therefore render itself irrelevant in readdressing 
the skewed income distribution and a better life for the majority of South Africans. 
John Gomomo, the former President of COSATU, argued that: 
 
  “ As labour we remain opposed to the basic thrust of the GEAR 
  strategy. We reject its approach to fiscal and monetary policies 
  which continue to see major cuts in government spending on  
  social security and basic infrastructure as well as continued 
rising interest rates. The effects of these policies are to choke 
the much needed economic growth and employment creation. 
It will also perpetuate the gap in wealth and incomes between the 
rich and the poor ”. (The Shopsteward, 1997; 6.3) 
 
Of concern too was the fact that unlike the RDP, GEAR was designed without the 
participation of the alliance members and the public. Thus, Willie Madisha (The 
Star, 23 August 1999), COSATU’s new President, reiterated that: 
 
“ As workers, we will not keep quiet on policies that severely 
disadvantage our members and have not been properly debated 
with us as COSATU ”.   
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Furthermore, COSATU and the SACP argued that since GEAR was essentially a 
product aimed at macro-economic restructuring, the cause of service delivery 
was subsequently lost. In the final analysis, GEAR is perceived to differ from the 
RDP not only in terms of its aims or objectives, but most obviously in policy 
outcomes. COSATU and the SACP criticised GEAR for its parochial focus on 
growth without development. They pointed out that GEAR failed to protect 
existing jobs and create new ones (The Shopsteward, 1998: 7.1), and concluded 
that GEAR was unable to address the problem of increasing poverty. Similar 
conclusions were reached by the South African Non-governmental Coalition 
(SANGOCO) after conducting nation-wide public hearings on poverty in 1998. 
 
Finally, COSATU (1998b) reiterated the role of the state by arguing that: 
 
 “ The state should act as a key economic agent. The state is a 
bigger employer, consumer and investor in the economy. Through 
fiscal and monetary policies and composition of its budget, an 
interventionist state is necessary to achieve our goals of economic 
development – in other words, to overcome poverty and redistribute 
power, wealth, income and economic opportunity from a small 
minority to the majority of the citizens ”. 
 
In order to force a reversal of GEAR, the labour movement therefore resolved to 
campaign for a moratorium on retrenchments, job creation, a living wage, and the 
promotion of reconstruction and development by the state (1998c). 
 
Edward Osborn (1997) also argued that the integration of the South African 
economy with the world economy – which GEAR advocated – was going to be 
detrimental to the economy as a whole. He argued that integration would destroy 
the competitiveness of local industry and introduce capital intensity into the 
labour market and thereby undermine job creation. Mafa Sejanamane (1998) 
pointed out that GEAR was ‘anti-democratic’ and that the strategy ‘acted as a 
major demobilising factor in  post-election South Africa’.    
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The advocates of the GEAR strategy, on the other hand, insisted that the 
strategy would work. The Finance Director–General, Maria Ramos; in particular, 
argued that a year after its implementation the GEAR policy had reaped some 
positive benefits at the macro-economic level (Mail & Guardian, June 27- July 3, 
1997). She claimed that portfolio investment, foreign direct investment, the 
performance of the manufacturing sector, including the prospects for job creation 
had improved. Ramos indicated, however, that inflation was still high. Thus, she 
argued that: “ We haven’t fully dealt with inflation properly. It is still significant. 
And down the line it will be much tougher to make the necessary adjustments; it’s 
a very short-term trade-off”.  
 
Moreover, Ramos (1997) defended GEAR by arguing that the strategy would not 
undermine delivery in terms of the RDP. She argued, instead, that GEAR created 
an environment which was conducive to growth in order for the government to 
implement the RDP: 
 
 
“ The RDP spells out the government’s social agenda. Gear 
creates an enabling environment and describes the aggregate level 
of government spending that would be consistent with 
maintaining macro-economic balance ”.  
 
Other proponents of GEAR (Goldin and Heymans, 1999) have argued that the 
strategy was aimed at ensuring the cost effectiveness of government 
departments when delivering services, discipline and a willingness on the part of 
consumers to pay for the services which the government renders. Goldin and 
Heymans (1999: 112) also described GEAR as: 
 
“ . . . a medium-term strategy to achieve specific targets  
of economic development, investment and growth,  
fiscal constraint, enhanced exports and trade employ- 
ment creation ”. 
  
Regardless of the criticism, the ANC government implemented the strategy. 
Since 1996, the Minister of Finance, Trevor Manuel, has already presented three 
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budgets within its framework. In the 1999/2000 budget, a 5 percent tax cut in 
company tax to boost investments and job creation by the private sector was 
announced, the government also announced that its target was a deficit of 3.5 
percent of the GDP for the year 2000 (Centre for Policy Studies, 1999). A 
Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) was also announced. The Africa 
Confidential (1999) termed this ‘a budget for believers’. Trevor Manuel tried to 
please both business and labour. SADEP (1999) also questioned the increases 
which were announced for social expenditure and argued that because of the 
roll-over of R9 billion from the 1996/7 budget, and the request for further funding 
by most departments, and in consideration of the inflation rate of 7.6 percent, real 
spending was reduced by R3.3 billion.  
 
Lastly, the 1999/2000 budget was seen to have attempted to balance fiscal 
discipline with incentives to investment and delivery according to the Centre for 
Policy Studies. COSATU criticised it for cutting back on infrastructural 
development in rural areas, enforcing a wage restraint, advocating reduction in 
the public service and further integrating South Africa’s economy into the global 
economy.  
 
THE ANC’S U-TURN 
 
The adoption of the GEAR policy by the ANC government was indeed a radical 
departure from the vision of a developmental state contained in the RDP. GEAR 
limited the role of the state in the economy and gave prominence to markets 
instead. In addition, and given that reconstruction and development had been led 
by the state since 1994, the ANC’s sudden about-turn in 1996 seems rather 
peculiar. Before GEAR was unveiled, the government showed an admirable 
capacity and determination to deliver on its election promises in line with the 
Freedom Charter and the RDP. It introduced, for instance, a nutritional 
programme for school children which reached 7 548 schools by August 1996 
(President N. Mandela, 1997). The government also spent R84.4 million to 
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rebuild schools. Over 700 000 people in rural areas especially were supplied with 
clean water. Free medical care for pregnant women and children was announced 
and a massive electrification programme for rural areas. 
 
In addition, the government expanded services by upgrading more than 500 
clinics (South Africa. Government’s Report to the Nation, 1998) and provided 42 
000 jobs per annum through its National Public Works Programme (Goldin and 
Heymans, 1999).   
 
These achievements contradict the assumed redistributive proclivities and the 
benignity of the market. Hence, the abandonment of the RDP has raised curious 
questions about the ANC in the post–1994 period. Gavin Lewis (1999), for 
instance, argued that before the general elections, the ANC was armed with ‘ 
some sort of Soviet five-year plan’. As government, it was forced to adopt 
pragmatism. Bond and Mayekiso (1996: 33) also argues that the changes in ANC 
economic policy after 1994 were expected since ‘. . . movement leadership 
drawn from the petty bourgeoisie is notoriously and eternally unreliable’. The 
problem with this view, however, is that it ossifies the liberation movements. It is 
thus unhelpful in explaining the changes as it fails to analyse the responses of 
various social forces within a liberation movement to their changing milieu.  
 
Then there is the view that the ANC ‘ . . . has discovered the needs of 
government’ (Steward and Liebenberg, 1997: xv). President Thabo Mbeki seems 
to agree with this argument for he argues that: 
 
“ A Minister gets exposed to certain information and opinions, and 
says, on this matter we must move in this direction, and he is 
formulating policy. What should happen, theoretically, is that the 
Finance Minister then comes back to the ANC and says, it is quite 
clear from what I know that we did not have a policy on this matter. 
I propose that we should have this or we do not have sufficient 
information, we had a wrong policy, I suggest we should have this 
new policy “. (The Shopsteward, 1996: 5.5)  
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Again, the problem with this argument is that it does not give any indications 
about the quality of any policy except to point out that the terrain of policy–
making has changed. Hence, we can conclude that changes in ANC economic 
policy are essentially the result of shifts in the balance of forces within the 
liberation movement itself. Nowhere was this made more clear than at the ANC’s 
50th National Conference in Mafikeng. According to Tom Lodge (1998), some 
delegates who voiced opposition to GEAR before the Conference saw the 
Conference as an opportunity to campaign for GEAR to be reversed. However, 
the resolutions on economic transformation which affirmed GEAR were passed 
unanimously and after only fifteen minutes of discussion. Thus even though there 
were delegates who were opposed to GEAR, the government’s macro-economic 
policy was not seriously challenged at the ANC’s national conference. In the light 
of the unanimous adoption of the resolutions, GEAR was instead adopted 
officially as the ANC’s macro-economic framework.   
  
CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter dealt with changes in economic policy after the adoption of the RDP 
as the ANC’s election manifesto in 1994. The GEAR macro-economic framework 
which the government adopted in 1996 is, in all respects, neo-liberal. The GEAR 
policy replaced the RDP’s vision of a developmental state with market 
fundamentalism.  
 
Yet, since 1994, the fulfilment of election promises by the ANC was only made 
possible by the state. The ANC government rebuilt schools, introduced nutritional 
programmes in an attempt to provide relief for the poor, and extended essential 
services such as electricity and clean water to them. Changes in the balance of 
forces within the ANC, however, influenced the changes in ANC economic policy. 
Hence, the adoption of GEAR in 1996. 
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However, the adoption of GEAR caused tensions between the ANC and 
COSATU and the SACP. Basically, both the SACP and COSATU argued that 
GEAR would fail to reduce poverty and redistribute wealth and income. Further, 
GEAR was identified as a home-grown structural adjustment programme. Hence, 
the next chapter assesses GEAR through a comparison with structural 
adjustment programmes. 
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  CHAPTER FOUR 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
A HOME-GROWN STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMME:  
CAN GEAR DELIVER? 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter focuses on parallels between GEAR and structural adjustment 
programmes (SAPs). It argues that given the disastrous record of SAPs in sub-
Saharan Africa, the impact of GEAR on economic performance is unlikely to be 
different. The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section explains the 
origins of structural adjustment programmes and their theoretical underpinnings, 
the second looks at the implementation GEAR and the last section makes an 
assessment of its performance. 
 
THE ORIGINS OF STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMMES 
 
At independence in the 1960s, African economies showed promising signs of 
growth. In most African countries GDP (Gross Domestic Product) growth 
averaged 5.7 percent (African Development Bank, 1995). In addition, African 
economies were geared mostly to commodity production. Agriculture contributed 
the largest share to the GDP. 
 
In the 1970s, however, the price of oil increased tremendously. As result, the 
terms of trade between African developing countries and the advanced capitalist 
countries in Europe deteriorated rapidly. For instance, the terms of trade in sub-
Saharan Africa dropped by 23 percent in 1986 (The World Bank and UNDP, 
1989).  Further, the increased price of exports and negative real interest rates in 
international markets, aggravated the plight of African economies. This resulted 
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in falling per capita incomes and African governments found it increasingly 
difficult to provide welfare and other basic necessities. The response of many 
governments to the crisis was to increase consumption expenditure and the role 
of the state in the economy (The World Bank and UNDP, 1989).    
 
The declining growth of the African economies, however, did not abate. Instead it 
worsened. Moreover, economic stagnation was compounded by the  eruption of 
a debt crisis. Since its eruption, external debt has never showed any signs of 
abating. In 1993, it increased by $18 billion to $269 billion in 1994 (African Bank, 
1995). The debt service ratio further aggravated the crisis in African economies 
because it permanently increased the indebtedness of African countries (George, 
1988).  
 
To the causes of the crisis we must of course add corruption, authoritarianism 
and gross mismanagement by African leaders (see Onimode, 1992). But as we 
can see, the crisis emanated mainly from external factors, in particular the 
worsening terms of trade and international interest rates. The International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and neo-liberal  economists argued that 
the domestic economic policies of African  countries were responsible for the 
debt crisis. As Gavin Williams (1994: 215) put it: 
 
“ The problems of international debt are the necessary 
consequence of the dominant strategies of industrialisation and 
development in Latin America and Africa in the post-war period, 
strategies which were emulated – indeed epitomised – by the 
policies of the Gierek regime in Poland in the 1970s ”. 
  
Also, both the IMF and the World Bank assumed that the economic crisis in 
African countries reflected only short-term financial difficulties (George, 1996; 
Vaggi, 1993). Hence, the two international financial institutions simply 
rescheduled loans to African governments. It was however only when the 
indebted countries defaulted on debt payments that structural adjustment 
packages were introduced.  
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According to the African Development Bank, the packages contained two main 
elements. The first was to ‘get prices right’ so as to reflect demand and second, 
the intervention of the state in the economy was assailed through a set of 
propositions aimed at reforming the public sector and the liberalisation of the 
economy.  
 
Helleiner (1992: 49) describes structural adjustment programmes as a ‘collection 
of supply side policy reforms’. This is in the light of the fact that, first, the IMF 
imposes on an indebted country which requires a loan, specific stabilisation 
measures such as the reduction of its deficits in the balance of payments by 
devaluing the local currency, reducing the fiscal deficit by limiting government 
expenditure, increasing prices for public services and food, and restraining 
wages. After these stabilisation measures have been implemented, structural 
reforms (adjustments) are then undertaken. These consist of the liberalisation of 
trade to expand the role of markets, privatisation and far reaching institutional 
reforms which are aimed at creating an efficient and a leaner administration of 
the state. The implementation of trade liberalisation and exchange rate policies is 
pursued by the IMF and the World Bank with greater depth (Lensink, 1996: 96). 
Furthermore, only after the indebted countries have committed themselves to 
these measures do they receive financial assistance from the international 
financial institutions. 
  
THE DELIVERY RECORD OF SAPS 
 
Even though the debate over the delivery record of structural adjustment 
programmes has not yet been concluded (African Development Bank, 1995: 
218), a large number of studies indicate that the programmes are a social and 
economic disaster. In particular, the provision of services such as health, water, 
education and housing suffer the most under structural adjustment programmes. 
In addition, in all the countries that have adopted the programmes, 
unemployment has increased considerably (African Development Bank: 1995). 
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Moreover, Michel Chossudovsky (1997) argues that the policies have 
impoverished millions of people and ruined the economies of most developing 
countries. This is reflected  in the spread of famine, a developing health crisis 
caused by a breakdown in the health care system because of insufficient funds 
and the closure of schools. He also pointed out that the devaluation of local 
currencies is followed by an increase in the prices of staple foods and public 
services. What is more, structural adjustment programmes reduce the capacity of 
even the middle class to pay for health and educational services as governments 
transform their institutions to become cost effective. As a result, maternal 
mortality has risen among this group, their school going children no longer go to 
school since they cannot afford escalating fees.    
 
The macro-economic results of structural adjustment programmes are reflected 
in the following tables: 
 
Table1. 
 
Analysis of the Contributions of Africa’s Main Sectors to GDP Growth,     
1990 - 1994       
_____________________________________________________________ 
Sector                     1990     1991      1992 1993     1994 
 
Agriculture     0.5      1.2          0.1   0.4       0.8 
Manufacturing    0.9      0.2          - 0.2   - 0.0       0.0 
Industry    2.0      1.2          - 0.1       - 0.4        0.1 
Services    1. 2       0.4         1.2         0.6          1.0 
   
 Source: African Development Bank (1995) African Development 
 Report, 1995. 
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In relation to macro-economic indicators too, African economies have not fared 
any better under structural adjustment programmes. Table 1.1 illustrates this fact: 
 
Table 1.1 
 
                         African Economic Indices, 1980 - 1994  
 
Economic indicators   1980 – 85 1986 – 93 1990 – 94 
 
Average growth rate of GDP      1.8               2.5      1.9 
Average growth rate of per capita GDP     - 1.1    - 0.5                - 1.1 
Average growth of investment      16.3    15.6      15.3 
Savings         14.9    13.8      12.7 
Average growth of exports       0.4     3.0      0.6 
Average rate of inflation       18.8    21.7      27.2 
 
Source: African Development Bank (1995) African Development 
Report, 1995.  
 
In short, structural adjustment programmes have failed to engender sustained 
growth as was promised by the IMF and the World Bank let alone deliver 
sustainable development. They have also failed to cure macro-economic 
imbalances which neo-liberal economists claim are the source of economic 
stagnation. Meanwhile, external debt has continued to accelerate and African 
economies have slipped further and further behind other developing countries in 
terms of economic development. This is despite the fact that the World Bank 
(1994: 61) applauded African governments for having ‘moved a long way toward 
good trade policies’ since their adoption of structural adjustment programmes in 
the 1980s.  
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GEAR AS A STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMME 
 
The South African government’s GEAR strategy, shares some important 
characteristics with structural adjustment programmes. Liberalisation, 
privatisation and wage constraints have all become part of the new language and 
state policy. In short, the government has committed itself to giving a prominent 
role to markets to spearhead reconstruction and development. 
 
The liberalisation of the economy is proceeding faster than the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) recommended (Michie and Padayachee, 1997). The WTO 
expected South Africa to lower its tariffs over a period of 12 years for its motor 
and textile industry. The government, however, committed itself to lowering the 
tariffs over 8 years. In addition, the government concluded a free–trade 
agreement with the European Union (EU) which, if implemented, will further 
lower South Africa’s tariffs (COSATU, 1999a).  
 
Another decision which the government took in order to implement GEAR, is to 
speed up the process of privatisation. The Minister of Public Enterprises, Jeff 
Radebe, announced in September 1999 that by 2004 the programme of 
privatisation would be completed (Sunday Independent, September 26).  
 
 “ Whether this takes the form of the outright sale of an asset, 
 its partial sale, or the bringing on board of a strategic equity  
partner, I want the process, as we have detailed it to be completed 
within this framework”.  
   
Before the announcement, the government had already sold 20 percent of the 
South African Airways to Swissair for R1. 4 billion, 20 percent of the Airports 
Company was sold to Italy’s Aero di Roma for R819 million, Protea Hotels were 
awarded a management contract to manage  Aventura holiday resorts for a 
period of five years. The government also intends completing the sale of 500 
000ha of its forests in October 1999. Restructuring plans for Telkom, Eskom and 
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Spoornet were also announced. The Finance Director–General, Maria Ramos 
argued that the intention was to reduce government debt and finance 
infrastructure. 
 
Tito Mboweni, the new governor of the Reserve Bank, also reaffirmed the 
commitment to fight inflation as the governor of the Reserve Bank and expressly 
lent his support to the further removal of exchange controls. Mboweni insisted in 
particular that: 
 
“ The liberalisation and international integration of financial services 
make it imperative for South Africa to bring domestic inflation in 
step with that of the rest of the world and to maintain sound and 
efficient financial institutions and markets. If these goals are not 
achieved, the economy could be subject to sudden reversals in 
international capital flows, exchange rate instability and volatile 
interest rates. The thrust of monetary policy in these circumstances 
should therefore be to establish and maintain financial stability, i.e. 
stability of prices, financial institutions and financial markets ”. 
 
Further, the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) which the 
government published in March 1998 also indicated the government’s intentions 
to withdraw from the economy. The MTEF expected expenditure to drop by 29 
percent in 2000 – 1 (Sunday Independent, 22/03/99). The government also 
intends to reduce the public service by one third. Allocations to provinces are to 
fall by 13.2 percent in 2000 – 1. Government policy framework has also given 
latitude to municipalities to initiate their own restructuring in order to mobilise 
private funding (see South Africa. Ministry in the Office of the President, 1995). 
This was exemplified mostly by the decision of the Johannesburg Transitional 
Metropolitan Council to implement its Igoli 2000 Plan, which envisages the 
privatisation of certain assets belonging to the municipality.  
 
The most controversial step which the government took to enforce the 
implementation of its GEAR policy was its stance against the public sector unions 
concerning wages. Negotiations between the unions and the government on 
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wage increases started in January 1999. From the start, the government offered 
wage increases within a fixed budget of R2.75 billion. According to COSATU 
(1999b), this reflected lower budgeting for wage increases from R3.37 billion in 
1998. For next year, the government expects that this will be cut by a further 
R2.5 million. In the wage negotiations for 1999, the unions demanded an inflation 
linked, across-the-board increase of between 10 and 15 percent. The 
government offered an increase of 5 percent. After four months of deadlocked 
negotiation the unions decided on a national strike by twelve public sector 
unions. They also revised their demand from 10 to 8 percent.  
 
The government still offered only a 6.3 percent wage increase (7 percent for 
teachers). When further negotiations failed to resolve the dispute, the Minister of 
Public Services and Administration, Geraldine Fraser–Moleketi, announced that 
the government would unilaterally implement its offer (Sunday Times, August 15, 
1999). She then called on the unions to negotiate a new wage policy for the year 
2000. The Minister’s announcement clearly indicated growing authoritarianism of 
the ANC government – a development reflected in the way in which GEAR was 
adopted. It is not surprising, therefore, that Vusi Nhlapo, President of the National 
Education Health and Allied Workers Union, viewed the announcement of the 
Minister as ‘a declaration of war’. In contrast the decision of the government was 
commended as a ‘watershed moment’ by the media (Sunday Times, 15/08/99). 
 
Finally, that the South African economy has fully integrated in the world economy 
was demonstrated by Alec Erwin, the Minister of Trade and Industry, when he 
addressed farmers. Erwin told the farming community that: 
 
   “ We have to accept that in South Africa all economic 
activities now are global activities. There’s no part of  our 
economy that is, or will be able to escape from the changes 
taking place in the global economy ”. 
(Business Day, 11 October, 1999). 
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To measure GEAR’s success, its proponents look at developments on the 
macro-economic level. It is argued, for instance, that inflation has now been 
reduced to an all time low of 3.2 percent after thirty years (Business Report, 3 
October, 1999). The IMF has also forecas an economic expansion of 3.5 percent 
in 2000 (Sunday Times, 26/09/99). Gold and foreign reserves have been boosted 
by R1.6 billion (Business Day, 03/ 09/99) and car sales have picked up. 
Furthermore, in September, Trevor Manuel, the Finance Minister, announced 
that provinces were running at a combined surplus of R1.1 billion (Sowetan, 
15/09/99)8.  
 
These macro-economic results are, however, contradicted by the speed of 
delivery. This has been noted mostly with respect to housing. In the RDP, the 
ANC promised to build 1 million houses within five years. The delivery of houses 
has fallen short by 60 percent (Sunday Independent, 27/09/99). The Eastern 
Cape, which ranks as the poorest province with the Northern Province, has built 
only 56 842 units, compared to Gauteng, South Africa’s richest province, which 
built 159 528 houses before the June 2nd elections. In addition, most of the 
completed houses are so small that they have been described as ‘toilets’ in the 
veld. The Minister of Housing, Sankie Mthembi-Mahanyele (Mail & Guardian, 
March 13 – 19, 1998), cited inadequate funding as the reason for failure to reach 
the target. The Homeless Peoples’ Federation (HPF: 1997) argues that the slow 
pace of the delivery of houses is hampered by the reliance of the government on 
the private sector to build the houses. Moreover, it has emerged that private 
sector contractors defraud the state of large sums of money when they are 
contracted to build the houses.    
 
Finally, privatisation and liberalisation have led to massive job losses. Some 
factories in the textile industry in particular have had to close as a result. Ebrahim 
                                                        
8 But see Albert van Zyl of Idasa (Sowetan, 15/09/99) who argued that the surplus was achieved at the 
expense of capital expenditure in contravention of the promise in the Gear strategy to increase capital 
expenditure.  
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Patel, the Assistant General Secretary of the South African Clothing and Textile 
Workers Union (SACTWU), argues that: 
 
“ By being five years ahead of our obligations we have sacrificed 
tens of thousands of jobs “. (Patel, 1999). 
      
Indeed, GEAR’s most marked failure is with respect to job creation – the Achiles 
heel of the ANC government. Against the promise of 400 000 jobs per annum, 
job losses on a massive scale have become the usual pattern in the South 
African economy. The following table demonstrates quarterly declines in 
employment in the major sectors of the South African economy: 
 
Table 1.2 
    
       Employment by sector, 1996 - 1999  
 
Sector       1996             1997                     1998             1999 
             2nd – 4th qt.            1st – 4th qt.        1st – 4th qt.  1st qt. 
 
Manufacturing      1 433 649 –             1 416 344 –       1 353 173 -      1 334 436   
         1  430 426                1 355 362  1 342 064  
 
Construction  325 926 –        314 706 -            297 016 -        248 813  
   312 051         301 371              255 220  
 
Commerce  755 575 –        756 957 -   785 312 -        853 341 
   775 577        784 186              834 290  
 
Mining  562 529 –        556 779 -   434 148 -            402 759 
   558 578        524 244             402 397 
 
Other (Transnet, 2 165 002 –      2 156 984 -   2 068 069 -      1 668 632 
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Telkom, finance, 2 158 946       2 194 360              2 063 834 
laundries and dry- 
cleaners etc.)  
 
Source: Central Statistical Services Bulletin of Statistics, 1996, 
1997, 1998, 1999. 
 
These consistent and steep declines in employment  were described as a 
‘bloodbath’ by the SACP.  
 
Improvements in this scenario are unlikely, given that the sectors that are  
affected most are those which require low and non-transferable skills. Alarm has 
also been raised by a forecast by the Human Sciences Research Council 
(HSRC: 1999) which predicted an increase of 45 000 jobs before 2003. Most of 
these jobs are predicted in the professional and managerial categories. In 
addition, mining was forecast to loose 45 000 jobs over the same period and the 
public sector 74 000. So, in overall terms there is no employment creation but 
rather jobless growth. 
 
Trevor Manuel, reacted with frustration to the news of more job losses. He 
remarked: 
 
  “ How on earth are we going to create employment? 
  What growth levels do we need, and what will be the  
  elements of the package that we create?” 
   (Leadership: 1999). 
 
Also in recognition of the crisis, the government urgently convened a Job Summit 
which highlighted the plight of the unemployed (Horton, Tregenna and 
Ngqungwana,1998: 20). The summit also helped to open up the debate about 
the macro-economic policy and resulted in agreements being reached on 
projects and programmes with promises of concrete job creation effects. 
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Agreement was also reached on concentration on those industries that are 
affected by tariffs reforms to prevent job losses, programmes to improve the 
delivery of houses, a social plan which aims to prevent job losses and 
employment decline and the investigation of the prescription of assets and the 
restructuring of the public pension fund to reduce the government’s debt 
(Declaration of the Presidential Job Summit, 1998). 
 
The GEAR strategy, is also failing at the macro-economic level. Aldezadeh 
(1999) argues that since 1996, the real growth rate has been steadily declining 
and was at 0,3% at the end of 1998.  The GDP also fell to 2.6%.  Investments, 
which were the goal of the strategy, have not improved and have plunged instead 
to 68% since 1996. Moreover, government debt is not declining but rising. Yet 
the government is still, in the pursuit of cost-effectiveness, intending to scale 
down the provision of electricity to rural households in the light of the 
restructuring of ESKOM (Reconstruct, 1999). Water projects were downscaled in 
1998 and this included the number of staff (Reconstruct, 1998) 
   
IS THERE AN ALTERNATIVE? 
 
Alec Erwin (1998:58) insisted that the GEAR strategy was necessitated by the 
changes in the international economic environment. He argued  that the South 
African government could not ignore those changes: 
   
  “ It would not only be naïve to ignore the realities of  
current international capital and commodity markets, it 
would be irresponsible and reckless.” 
 
 
Erwin added that: 
 
 “However, this recognition is not in order to surrender all  
policy autonomy to these realities, but to seek to shape  
the outcome of events within the reality of constraining 
factors and thereby maximise our relative autonomy”. 
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Andrew Feinstein (1996), too, argues that GEAR was a ‘pragmatic’ response to 
the dominance of trade and investment capital. 
    
This perspective does not explain why this alternative was chosen instead of 
others which did not compromise the full autonomy of the state such as those 
that were practised in East Asia. In other words, to paraphrase Leo Panitch (cited 
in Albo, 1997), the argument does give a clear analysis of the reasons why it was 
necessary for the ANC to accommodate neo-liberalism to the extent that it did. 
For it is implicit in Erwin’s argument that there is a recognition that a defence of 
GEAR makes for unsound economic action. The argument demonstrates that 
GEAR is, in the light of the conditions in South Africa, not an appropriate 
economic policy. If this is the case, the defence cannot be raised at all unless it is 
to indicate an acceptance of the essential principles and tenets of neo-liberalism. 
Furthemore, Patrick Bond (1999) pointed out that GEAR has instead increased 
the vulnerability of the South African economy to globalisation. Thus, he makes a 
case for South African socialists to forge alliances with civil society to resist the 
neo-liberal agenda of global financial capital.  
 
John Smithin (1996) has also argued that the trade-off between employment 
creation and inflation which is advocated in neo-liberal economic policies such as 
GEAR, carry longer term consequences for the poor. 
  
“ The economic slowdowns and the recessions required to 
reduce inflation to a low level seem to be much deeper and  
long-lasting, particularly in terms of unemployment, than  
could be reasonably be described by the expression ‘short 
-term”. (Smithin,1996: 69). 
 
South Africa has experienced two financial crises since 1994. Unemployment 
and job losses have increased substantially. The folly of opening the economy 
further was also demonstrated by the job losses and the closure of some mines 
which followed the decision by the British government to auction its gold 
reserves. In South African conditions, policies such as GEAR can therefore never 
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be able to protect the poor against the vagaries of the market. In fact, GEAR can 
only lead to famine once poverty is exacerbated.     
 
The response of ANC leaders to the criticism of the GEAR policy has implied 
however that there is no alternative. For example, after Winnie Madikizela– 
Mandela, President of the ANC’s Women League, criticised GEAR in a press 
statement, the ANC said the ‘statements were not new’ and were a ‘healthy 
ingredient of our democracy and contributes to the enhancement of a culture of 
debate (Business Day, 10/09/99). President Thabo Mbeki also told delegates at 
the tenth SACP Congress that those who were criticising Gear were engaging in 
‘fake revolutionary posturing’. He  added that: 
 
“ If I may speak frankly, in reality some within the movement who 
think they know, only know what we have been fed by those who 
are opposed to our movement and to the fundamental 
transformation of our society”9. 
 
It is argued in this thesis that an alternative to GEAR is, in fact, possible and 
necessary. All that is required to realise it is political will and courage. 
Participation by the people of South Africa needs to be included as a key 
principle. This will reduce the role of technocrats who are removed from the 
experiences of the people in the real economy. Economists have  demonstrated 
that, within a globalised world economy, it is also possible to regulate the 
movement of capital and direct it towards employment creation. The state can in 
this way be provided with the revenue to fund its redistribution efforts. A range of 
other possibilities also needs to be investigated with respect to the breaking of 
monopolies in the media, the trading and the commercial sectors. Finally, tariffs 
could also be used to increase demand and thereby encourage new products 
(Aldezadeh, 1996).  
 
                                                        
9 Statement of the President of the ANC, Thabo Mbeki at the tenth Congress of the South African 
Communist Party, 10th July 1998, Johannesburg. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The chapter attempted to draw parallels between GEAR and structural 
adjustment programmes. The chapter also attempted to demonstrate that in 
Africa structural adjustment programmes failed to bring about development. By 
making this comparison, the chapter argued that as GEAR is a home-grown 
structural adjustment programme, it’s results will be no different in South Africa. 
The performance of GEAR since 1996, is in accordance with this assertion. 
Since, the government liberalised the economy and introduced privatisation in 
line with the GEAR policy framework, massive job losses have occurred in 
almost all sectors of the South African economy. In addition, GEAR is failing to 
achieve some of its macro-economic targets in terms of growth, exports and 
investments. Hence, an alternative to GEAR is necessary.  
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   CONCLUSION 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
 
The aim of this thesis was to make a contribution to the debate concerning the 
future of South Africa’s Growth, Employment And Redistribution (GEAR)  
strategy. By situating the debate on GEAR, within the context of the debates on 
the state and the market, the thesis argued that the South African government’s 
macro-economic framework will fail to alleviate poverty and bring about 
reconstruction and development. The GEAR strategy is premised on the 
conviction that markets have the capacity to redistribute income and wealth and 
to expand services to the poor.  
 
In chapter one, the thesis confronted this faith in the market by arguing that the 
market increases uneven development. Further, the chapter argued that the 
market has never dominated society for any lengthy period. When it did so, a 
social and an economic crisis developed. One of the first crises which the market 
generated was in 1929. This prompted the governments of developed countries 
to increase state intervention in their economies. In the aftermath of the crisis, a 
new intellectual tradition which justified state intervention emerged.  
 
In the 1980s, however, neo-liberalism predominated. This ideology spearheaded 
market fundamentalism. In turn market fundamentalism was responsible for 
much of the reversal of the gains that were made by the state in terms of welfare, 
redistribution and the meeting of basic needs. However, another severe crisis in 
the closing years of the 1990s occurred. This discredited market fundamentalism 
once again. Against this background the chapter argued for a developmental 
state. 
 
Chapter two focused on the origin of the vision of a developmental state in South 
Africa’s liberation movement, the ANC. Throughout the liberation struggle the 
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ANC maintained consistency in its vision. The developmental vision thus became 
the ANC’s election manifesto in the first democratic elections in 1994. Thus, the 
chapter identified links between three strands of development in macro-economic 
policy formulation, namely, the origins of the Freedom Charter, the PASA 
debates in the 1980s and the emergence of the RDP in 1994 which advocated ‘a 
leading and enabling role of the state’. 
 
After the ANC came to power in 1994 it showed a commitment to implementation 
of the RDP. This was in line with the Freedom Charter. The ANC government 
expanded services as was called for by the Charter by supplying clean water to 
1.3 million people. Comfort and security was brought to rural households when 
the government electrified of 400 000 households. The government also 
encouraged free and compulsory schooling by providing 4.9 million children with 
a free primary school feeding scheme; it also expanded access to health by 
building over 500 clinics and introducing free medical care for pregnant women 
and children under six years. Finally, the government  provided 421 000 
telephone connections. Thus, bringing comfort and security in the rural areas. In 
addition, through its infrastructural programmes, the government created 250 000 
jobs and trained 100 000 people. Hence, for the first few years since 1994, South 
Africa had an active state which led development. 
   
Chapter three is about the departure from this vision of the RDP. The departure 
came in the form of the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) 
strategy. GEAR aimed at creating a competitive and fast growing economy. It 
proposed to achieve this aim by liberalising the economy, introducing 
privatisation, reforming the labour market in order for it to be flexible, and 
reducing the size of the public sector. By proposing these measures, GEAR 
aimed at giving prominence to markets. This development indicated that the 
government indeed abandoned the RDP. The chapter argued therefore that the 
changes in economic policy were brought about by shifts in the balance of forces 
within the ANC. 
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The GEAR strategy will however fail to deliver. This was the subject of chapter 
four. The chapter attempted to draw parallels between GEAR and structural 
adjustment programmes in Africa. It indicated that under neo-liberal economic 
policies, social services such as health and education, always suffer. Moreover, 
the policies are the major cause of job losses. Since the adoption of GEAR in 
1996, employment in almost all the sectors of the South African economy 
declined quarterly. And in the light of further liberalisation and the increased 
movement towards privatisation and the reduction of the public service, 
employment creation will remain the Achilles heel of the ANC government.  
 
The argument of the thesis therefore is that the government’s macro-economic 
policy, will fail to alleviate poverty and bring about reconstruction and 
development.  
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